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Abstract
Structured financial products including credit-linked notes and collateralized
debt obligations were popular before the credit crisis but then delivered substan-
tial loss to investors. Driver for investment decision in those products is key to
understanding the fundamental causes of the crisis. Classical portfolio theory
suggests that investors would shun away from unfamiliar financial products. This
familiarity bias holds especially for unsophisticated household investors. The rapid
growth of structured products market, the newest financial innovations, presents
an opportune setting to test such conventional wisdoms. Using unique house-
hold investment data from Hong Kong, we show that product distributors’ sell-
ing intensity is an important determinant for investors’ allocation in structured
products. On the other hand, more financially literate investors, who are more
capable of optimizing asset allocation, include less structured products into their
portfolios. Important determinants according to mean-variance analysis, such as
product premium, have little explanatory power to investor’s allocation decisions.
Our finding suggests that investments in structured products prior to the credit
crisis were more likely to be pulled by distributors. This paper demonstrates the
importance of financial literacy for investment decisions.
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1 Introduction
Securitization is the main channel transforming the U.S. subprime housing market de-
cline into a global credit crisis. Those subprime mortgage loans are first packaged into
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which are then repackaged into collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). Those CDOs, mostly bearing AAA credit ratings, are either kept
on the investment banks’ balance sheet, or insured by credit default swaps (CDS), or
sold to investors all over the world. Securitization was the biggest U.S. export to the
world in the 21st century till the crisis broke out in August 2007.1 After the crisis,
international investors, especially those from high savings countries such as China, are
blamed to be the root cause of the crisis. The critics claim that U.S. asset demand
directed capital inflows drove global imbalance, fueled the real estate bubble, and facil-
itated excessive consumption.2 Such claims are crucially hinged on the asset demand
assumption. However, whether transactions are driven by the demand or supply is an
empirical issue. Were capital flows into securitization market pulled or pushed? In this
paper we investigate household investment decisions in structured products using unique
data from Hong Kong.
Household financial behavior could provide microfoundation for macroeconomic fluc-
tuations (see Mian and Sufi (2009) for leverage choice). Investment patterns at individ-
ual investor level prior to the crisis is important to understand the root causes of the
crisis. The crisis reveals that CDOs were, to a large extent, poor investment choice.
Practitioners, academics, and regulators have quickly reached a rare consensus on the
detrimental role of CDOs in the economy. However, CDOs are merely a financial inno-
vation subject to market selection. One adverse realization of investment return does
not totally disprove their usefulness as an investment tool. After all, investors seemingly
had non-satiable appetite for CDOs and other structured products prior to the crisis
as evidenced by the flourish of such markets. Did investors understand the risk-return
profiles of those investments when investing in them?
Individual investors’ appetite for structured products is puzzling from several as-
pects. First, a security will be included in an investor’s portfolio only if it is on the
1“Evil Wall Street Exports Boomed With ‘Fools’ Born to Buy Debt”, Bloomberg.com, August 27,
2008.
2“Paulson says crisis sown by imbalance,” Financial Times, January 1, 2009. “. . . it is impossible
to understand this crisis without reference to the global imbalances . . . ” Ben S. Bernanke, Speech at
the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., March 10, 2009. Curbing global imbalance is the
main agenda of the G-20 meetings in November, 2009. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) develop a
model to show how global imbalance has driven the US securitization boom and bust. Other references
include Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) and Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumburg (2009).
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efficient frontier (see Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2009) for a review of portfolio
theories). However, evidence from U.S., U.K., Germany, Swiss, among others, shows
that structured products are massively overpriced.3 Second, structured products are
financial innovations with little historical performance data and much ambiguity. Ambi-
guity averse investors would avoid such investments. Third, CDOs and other structured
products have capped returns but substantial downside due to default risk. Such feature
does not match investors’ preference for positive skewness (Barberis and Huang (2008),
Kumar (2009)).
One potential explanation for individual investors’ seemingly suboptimal investments
in structured products is that investors misunderstood them and simply followed the
fads. Taken for granted the disadvantage of investing in structured products, the re-
maining question is whether the investment mistakes were made by investors themselves
(investment was ”pushed” by investors) or induced by the product issuers (investment
was “pulled” by issuers). It is no surprise that bounded rational investors make sub-
optimal investment decisions (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007)). Individual invest-
ment practice is constrained by transaction costs, information processing capacity, and
liquidity shocks. Even perfectly informed investors may rebel conventional wisdoms.
DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) show that a naive 1/N rule outperforms sophis-
ticated mean-variance optimization strategies in historical data. On the other hand,
CDOs could be mis-sold to investors by investment banks and other financial intermedi-
aries (Inderst and Ottaviani (2009)). It is important to distinguish these two alternatives
(investor mistake or mis-selling) for security design and market regulation.
Empirical study of investments in retail structured products is difficult as investors
are hard to identify. Obtaining such information from brokers or banks is unrealistic
for confidentiality reasons. It is commonly believed that CDOs are only sold to institu-
tional investors. However, it was revealed through the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 that individual investors in Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore
in particular) have invested in CDOs disguised under other names from local bank dis-
tributors in retail structured products market. Thousands of individuals bought “mini-
bonds”, a type of credit-linked notes (CLNs), issued by Lehman Brothers from 2003 to
2008. Many bought “constellation”, CLN referencing Lehman Brothers, issued by De-
velopment Bank of Singapore (DBS) in 2006-2007. Although ownership data on CDOs
is extremely prohibited as such securities are privately placed, the minibond incident
provides a unique opportunity to examine such investment decision.
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy unveils that many structured products investors
3See Wilkens and Stoimenov (2007), Henderson and Pearson (2008), and Bergstresser (2008).
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in Hong Kong are likely to lose their investment significantly4. Hence, they gather
together and often hold demonstrations to ask for government intervention. Through
those occasions we interviewed 783 investors and collected comprehensive data about
their demographic background and transaction details over the period of January to
June 2009. Our subjects include not only minibond and constellation investors, but also
equity-linked notes (ELNs) investors who bought ELNs issued by or linked to Lehman
Brothers via over-the-counter transactions. Investors are willing to share information
with us as they want to draw more attention and investigation. We augment investor
information with detailed description of structured products compiled by Securities and
Futures Commission (SFC), which is the securities market authority of Hong Kong and
government body investigating the incident.
Our first finding is that most product characteristics are not associated with invest-
ment decisions. Investors did not invest more fraction of their wealth in higher premium
products. Counter-intuitively, given the same level of premium and other product char-
acteristics, investment amount increases with the true riskiness of the product. Those
products are so complex that the true riskiness can be overshadowed by the perceived
(false) safeness. The only other significant product characteristic is coupon payment
frequency. All else equal, investors preferred products with more frequent coupon pay-
ments, although payment frequency plays limited role in asset allocation theories. Those
findings may appear puzzling but could be consistent with issuer’s successful extraction
of consumer surplus.5 The explanatory power of product characteristics for allocation
decision is limited, with an adjusted R2 of 2.5% in the regression using all prominent
product features.
Investor background did not matter much either. Investor expenditure on lottery
tickets, our measure of risk aversion, is statistically insignificant in explaining invest-
ment proportion in structured products. Life cycle variables such as age, employment,
marriage, and gender are also insignificant. Financial background has some effect. High
income earners and homeowners made significantly less investments in structured prod-
ucts. Such findings are also puzzling because, regardless whether we treat structured
products as risky assets or safe assets, investor profile variations should differentiate
4According to Ernst & Young’s report to Hong Kong Association of Banks, minibond on average
worths 53% of principal amount on November 21, 2008. For constellation, according to issue prospectus,
distributing banks should redeem constellation at “credit event amount”, which is referred to the market
value of subordinate bond of Lehman Brothers (less than 10% of principal after Lehman Brothers
bankrupted).
5It is interesting to note that at the beginning US dollar denominated minibonds and HK dollar
denominated minibonds have the same coupon rate but different coupon rates for later issues, although
HK dollar is pegged to US dollar.
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investment allocations, through the argument of “revealed preference”. Again, adjusted
R2 from investor background variables is merely 4.3%. We further consider transaction
environment and market conditions. To our surprise, investors who are more trusting
the distributors and more familiar with salespeople bought significantly less. Neither
equity market condition nor credit market condition affects allocation.
Combining the effects of product characteristics, investor background, transaction
environment, and market condition only produces an adjusted R2 of 6.9%. Most of the
economically important variables turn out to be insignificant. It is difficult to tell a
demand story from our findings. To further directly examine the supply effect, we con-
sider the distributing banks’ selling intensity by the initiator of the transaction and the
procedure of the transaction. If bank salespeople initiate the transaction, they are more
likely to be the pursuer of the transaction and actively maneuver deal closing. Investors
are more likely to be passive buyers. The government requires a risk profile evaluation
for qualification of structured product investment. If bank salespeople neglected, most
likely purposefully, the risk evaluation, then the selling side is aggressively completing
the transaction. We find that both measures of selling intensity are positively signifi-
cant. When bank salespeople approach the buyer for investments in structured product,
investors allocate 16% more into such products. If risk evaluation is not done before
closing the deal, investment will be 7% bigger.
Above evidence suggests that investments in structured products are more likely to
be “pulled” by the issuers. In such case, will individual investor financial literacy be
effective in attenuating the influence from the supply side (e.g., sales pitch)? We hypoth-
esize that more financially literate investors are better positioned to fend off investment
sophistry. Our measure of financial literacy is related to reasonable expectation of stock
returns in Hong Kong market. We expect more financially literate investors will be-
have more consistently with rational expectation based theories. In the case of retail
structured products, ambiguity averse investors would participate less. Empirical results
are consistent with such prediction: Financially literate investors buy about 10% less
structured products. This finding is robust to alternative measures of financial literacy.
Next we investigate the channels through which financial literacy works. The blossom
of financial engineering and the field of mathematical finance in recent years suggests
that calculating ability can be important for investment. However, we find that, while
individually both calculation and comprehension capabilities are important, jointly com-
prehension has more important effects. Hence, improving investor’s understanding of
the market seems to be a good lesson learned from this structured product experience
(mathematical skills are arguably more related to IQ). However, the premise is that
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investors can learn. If better investment decisions are due to intelligence which can
hardly be improved upon training, then investor education programs will not be useful.
Therefore, it is important to know which components of financial literacy, education or
intelligence (IQ6), will help investors make better investment decisions. We find that
both education and IQ have significant effect on allocation decisions with control for
other factors. Moreover, education seems to be relatively more important with a higher
stand-alone adjusted R2 (9.9%) than IQ (adjusted R2 2.6%). Our findings on finan-
cial literacy, cognitive ability, education, and IQ are robust across investor groups and
product types. Moreover, these results prevail after controlling for Heckman’s sample
selection bias.
In his American Finance Association (AFA) Presidential Address, Campbell (2006)
summarizes empirical evidence on household finance and argues that the poorer and
less well educated make more investment mistakes. Furthermore, he believes that some
financial products exist to exploit naive investors. Our empirical evidence supports his
conjecture. At household level for Hong Kong structured product investments, risk-
return tradeoff is not the main decision metric, financial literacy plays a bigger role.
However, we also point out that some very well educated investors also invest in such
products and that the highest adjusted R2 explaining structured product investments is
less than 20%. Therefore, the majority of cross-sectional variations in investor decision
is not identified. Either investors made random decisions or distributors were overly suc-
cessful in marketing/selling. Currently our data cannot distinguish those two scenarios.
While bounded investor rationality may have played some role in the structured prod-
ucts market, investor demand of such products (the “push” effect) was not the driving
force for market growth.
Our paper could shed light on the importance of financial market regulation. On
one hand, regulators can restrain disadvantaged investors from participating in certain
sectors of the market to minimize the effect of investor bounded rationality. On the
other hand, regulators can penalize misbehaving financial intermediaries. Our empirical
results suggest that both approaches are needed as investors made unjustified invest-
ment choices facilitated by bank mis-selling. Carlin and Manso (2009) show that issuer
of financial products may have the incentive to strategically add product complexity
to extract consumer surplus. If individual investors can be easily misled by distribu-
tors, they may hardly defend against issuer’s exploitation strategy. A natural solution
is for unsophisticated investors to delegate investment decisions to professional man-
6Our intelligence variable measures investor’s cognitive ability after extracting her education. We
acknowledge that this is not a direct measure of IQ. In order to examine the effect of IQ, we construct
several indirect measures (intelligence). For details, please refer to Table VIII.
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ager. However, in his AFA Presidential Address, Stein (2009) argues that institutional
investors face their own constraints and increasing their influence does not necessarily
improve market efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We first discuss our motivation relative
to the existing literature in Section II. In Section III we describe typical structured prod-
ucts with a focus on Hong Kong market. Data and sample characteristics are presented
in Section IV. Our main empirical analyses on investment allocation are provided in
Section V. Robustness checks are supplied in Section VI. Section VII summarizes our
findings and concludes.
2 Related Literature
The investment literature often assumes good behavior from all market players: security
issuers design a new product to improve social welfare, financial intermediaries truthfully
transmit information about the products, investors understand the product and execute
the best strategy. It is an empirical issue whether these conditions are met in reality.
The best evidence is from laboratory experiments and field experiments. For example,
Charness and Levin’s (2005) lab experiments show that investors over-extrapolate from
their former experience and tend to follow a suboptimal reinforcement strategy. Choi,
Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2009) substantiate such result using individual 401(k)
investment data. Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) have similar findings for individual IPO
investors. Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Eguia and Zame (2009) show that investor’s cognitive
biases hinder information updating, lead to perceived ambiguity, and cause deviation
from rational decision making.
Above studies are on stocks or familiar investment vehicles. The findings may not
generalize to financial innovations such as structured products. We examine how indi-
vidual investors actually make allocation decisions over new illiquid financial products,
which is part of household finance that needs more empirical research as advocated by
Campbell (2006). Although Das and Statman (2009) argue that structured products can
help improve portfolio allocation, several recent studies suggest that retail structured
financial products are persistently overpriced by about eight percent (see Henderson
and Pearson (2008), and Bergstresser (2008)). A natural question is how the issuers
get investors to buy large amount of such overpriced products. Investors have little
prior knowledge about those investments. Theories on choice under ambiguity would
imply zero participation in such case. Hence, market frictions might have existed to defy
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compliance with theoretical predictions. Subrahmanyam (2009a) shows that financial
intermediaries such as distributing banks may delay educating inexperienced individual
investors in order to earn more commissions. Moreover, Carlin and Manso (2009) argue
that firms may strategically use product complexity to extract consumer surplus. Our
empirical results will shed light on the existence of such frictions.
How can individual investors make best investment decisions in a market flourished
with financial innovations issued by strategic financial intermediaries? One answer is
market selection. Only those good at financial securities (financially literate) should
be participating. However, Hilgert, Hogorth and Beverly (2003), Agrew and Szykman
(2005), National Council on Economic Education’s report (NCEE 2005), show that
most Americans fail to understand basic financial concepts and conditions of financial
instruments, such as consumer loans and mortgages. More recently, Lusardi and Mitchell
(2006, 2008) report a wide-spread lack of ability on interest compounding among older
(50+) individuals in the U.S.. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) show a lack of knowledge on
debt among all U.S. citizens. Similar problems of low financial literacy are also found
in other countries.7
More importantly, lack of financial literacy influences individual suboptimal saving
and portfolio choices. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2008) find that, those
who have a better understanding of compound interest, inflation and diversification are
more likely to set up plans for retirement. On portfolio choice, less literate investors
are less likely to invest in stocks (van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007), Yoong (2007),
Christelis, Jappelli, and, Padula, (2008)), and less likely to choose mutual funds with
lower fees (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008)). Similarly, Campbell (2006) reports
that individuals with lower income and education level – characteristics that are closely
related to financial literacy – are less likely to refinance their mortgages during a period
of falling interest rates.
Further studies have shown the channels through which financial literacy works.
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009) use more than 1000 adults in Germany and
find that investor’s IQ, which is a usual proxy for cognitive ability, is negatively related
to risk aversion and impatience. Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2009 a,b) also
find that high IQ investors are more likely to participate in stock market, and pick stocks
with higher returns using data from Finland. Another conceivable way to improve finan-
cial literacy is education. Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) argue that “education and the
free acquisition of information are important in overcoming the barrier to stockholding
7See OECD (2005), Smith and Stewart (2008), Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2008), Moore (2003),
Miles (2004).
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erected by ignorance and misperceptions.” Similar results is found by Luigi and Jappelli
(2005) who show that education is positively correlated with individual awareness of
stocks. In addition, Campbell (2006) suggests that education helps reduce households’
entry cost to stock market. He shows that educated households in Sweden diversify
their portfolio more efficiently, and can expect higher returns if they participate in stock
market. Woodward (2003) reports that college education is associated with a remark-
able $1,500 reduction in average broker fees for mortgage loans. Lusardi and Mitchell
(2006, 2008), Lusardi and Tofano (2009), Stango and Zinman(2009) also suggest that
more financial education is needed to improve investors’ financial literacy.
However, while it is easy to reach consensus on financial literacy, discontent exists on
the effectiveness of education. One discontent is argued by Heckman (2006) that the re-
lationship between cognitive and non-cognitive skills is complex, such that non-cognitive
skills and personality traits could cause people to endogenously create environments dur-
ing childhood that foster faster cognitive development. Education has less effect on cog-
nitive ability when it is given later, an may provide little help on their decision making.
Another discontent is about the debate on effectiveness of financial literacy education.
Bernheim, Garret, and Maki (2001) show that high school financial literacy training
programs will significantly increase individuals’ saving rates 5 years after graduation.
Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (2009) provide evidence that frequent retirement seminars
increase both of individuals’ participation rates and contribution rates to savings plans.
However, Mandell and Klein (2009) find high school students who have taken financial
education do not demonstrate higher levels of financial literacy than those who have
not taken such courses. Moreover, Cole and Shastry (2009) suggest that one more year
of education will lead to 7.6% more chance to receive positive investment income. But
this effect does not come from mandatory financial literacy curriculum in schools, yet,
is due to individual’s cognitive ability to accomplish the education. The data on Hong
Kong household investments in structured financial products provide a good setting for
us to investigate above issues. We shed light on investor behavior in a new market of
illiquid securities (with plenty of ambiguity). Our results on financial literacy, cognitive
abilities, IQ, and education will help resolve some of the theoretical debates.
Our study follows a similar vein as by Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009). They
focus on index fund choice by individual investors. Different from their hypothetical
investment setting, our subjects made real investments and they might not have had
choices. Nevertheless, we both emphasize the importance of financial literacy.
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3 Market for Retail Structured Financial Products
Structured financial products, characterized by customized payoff streams and illiquid
secondary market, have become increasingly popular investment vehicles. The most
well known structured product is probably collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which
are the key driver of the recent credit market boom (2005-2007) and bust (2007-2009).
(See Brunnermeier (2009) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) for overviews.) How-
ever, given the extremely high requirement of minimal investment in CDOs, individual
investors can hardly afford to purchase such products. Structured financial products,
characterized by customized payoff streams and illiquid secondary market, have become
increasingly popular investment vehicles. The most well known structured product is
probably collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which are the key driver of the recent
credit market boom (2005-2007) and bust (2007-2009). (See Brunnermeier (2009) and
Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) for overviews.) However, given the extremely high
requirement of minimal investment in CDOs, individual investors can hardly afford to
purchase such products. As such, structured products targeting retail investors were
created to meet investors’ needs. A typical way is to add CDOs (or other derivatives)
into the collateral pool of retail structured products, and then sell the retail structured
products with a much lower minimal investment threshold.
Retail structured products has been sold to individual investors ever since mid 1990s
in Europe, but become noticeable in Hong Kong only after 2003. In the February of
2003, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commissions (SFC) relaxed prospectus rules for
unlisted securities, and ignited the retail structured product market. Before the change,
issuers of structured products need to register for both programme prospectus and issue
prospectus for each issue, even if a series of issues belong to the same programme (eg.
minibond 3, minibond 5, ...). Under the new rule of “dual prospectus”, issuers only
need to register for programme prospectus for the first issue. For the later issues, issuers
simply register for issue prospectus but do not need to register for programme prospectus.
This largely reduced the cost for issuers to issue products. Another reason for the
spring up of retail structured products in Hong Kong is because of the low interest rate
around 2003. Due to the low interest rate, bank depositors are eager to find substitutes
for saving. The high coupon rate along with the seemingly “safe” feature of some
structured products made them attractive to retail investors. These structured products
target retail users typically by using well-known companies or popular share issues as
reference entities. Some are transparently speculative but others, can be designed to
seem conservative in their headline terms, like “minibond” issued by Lehman Brothers.
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Figure 1 illustrates the global sales of retail structured products from 2002 to 2009.
During the emerging period from 2002 to 2007, the sales of retail structured products in
Hong Kong has risen from USD0.6 billion to USD44.3 billion. During the credit crisis
period of 2007 to 2009, structured product market drop all over the world. But what
surprises us is that the market in Hong Kong dropped much more than that in any
other places. In 2009, Hong Kong structured product market faced a 78.7% drop, which
is much larger than that in Europe (11.4%), Asia Pacific (37.1%), and North America
(44.7%). One potential explanation could be ascribed the fall of Lehman Brothers.
Before its bankruptcy, Lehman was one of the most successful in this market with a 35
percent market share and over 33,000 Hong Kong buyers (see Lejot (2008)). Besides its
negative impact to the market, Lehman’s bankruptcy has also ignited a conflict between
structured product investors and the product distributors. In fact, investors in Hong
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were shocked when they were informed of their holdings in
retail structured financial product were issued or related to the failed Lehman Brothers.
At the time of Lehman Bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, HKD20.173 billion
structured products associated with Lehman were still outstanding in the market from
43,707 investment accounts.8 Two types of structured products are affected by Lehman
bankruptcy: credit-linked note (CLN) and equity-linked note (ELN). The most pub-
licized is “minibond” CLN issued by Lehman Brothers. Another noteworthy CLN is
“constellation” issued by Development Bank of Singapore (DBS). Appendix III pro-
vides detailed issuance information on minibond and constellation. The investment in
these three groups of products take 97% of the total investment in Lehman Brothers
related products.
Figure 2 shows the structure of CLNs and ELNs. CLNs are medium-term notes with
first-to-default feature. Their payouts are based on a group of companies’ (“reference
entities”) credit performance. Those notes normally have 3 to 5 years investment horizon
with coupon rates slightly higher than quarterly bank deposit rates. However, the risks
of CLNs come from multiple sources. Take minibond series 35 as an example. The first
risk is from underlying collateral. When investors purchase the minibond, issuer will use
the proceeds collected from investors to buy high quality assets (often to be AAA rated
CDOs) as underlying collateral for the minibond. When there is an event of default
for collaterals, minibond will be redeemed early at the price based on the proceeds
of selling the collateral assets (so called “early redemption amount”), which may be
significantly below the principal amount of the minibond outstanding. The second risk
8“List of information/ documents requested by Members”, Hong Kong legislative Council,
www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/hc/papers/hc1013cb2-100-3-e.pdf
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is swap counterparty risk. The issuer signs swap contracts to hedge currency risk and
interest rate risk. Swap counterparty takes the yields from the underlying collaterals and
provides fixed coupon payment to the investors. But when default of swap counterparty
occurs, minibond will also be redeemed at the early redemption amount. Finally, the
investors’ position as insurer in the swap leads to another risk. The swap is based on
the credit performance of the reference entities (normally 5 to 8 names).9 For the case
of minibond, the credit rating for these reference entities may range from AA+ to BBB.
If any of these reference entity goes bankrupt, fails to pay its liability, or is restructured,
minibond will be redeemed at an amount based on selling of the subordinate debt of
that troubled reference entity. In this case, investors may lose most of their investments.
We summarize the payoff function (gross return) of CLNs, take minibond series 35 for
example, as follow:
f(x) =

1 + it : if issuer exercise call option before maturity date;
x : if early redemption event occurs;
rj : if credit event occurs to reference entity j;
1 + 5.6% : if nothing happens.
Here it is the cumulative coupon rate before the day issuer exercise call option; x is the
value of collateral regarding to one share of CLNs when early redemption event occurs;
rj is the recovery rate of the subordinated notes of the reference entity to which credit
event occurs.
For equity-linked notes, as illustrate in Figure 2, investors also suffer from the un-
derlying collateral risk and swap counterparty risk. The key difference in the structure
of ELNs with that of CLNs is that the swap is linked to the stock price of a basket of
(normally 3 to 6) companies. Figure 3 shows how the payoff of ELNs is linked to the
stock price of the reference companies. Take Pyxis Series 21, an ELN issued by Lehman
Brothers in May 2007, for example. The investment horizon of the note is 2.5 years.
Coupon will be paid every half a year after issuance at the observation dates. During
each of the second to fifth observation dates, there are four auto-calls by the issuer. If
the closing price of each reference stock on observation date is at or above 96% of its
fixing price (equal to the stock price when the note is issued), the note will be redeemed.
This auto-call structure bundled with the fixed coupon rate put a “cap” on the payoff.
9Reference names for Minibond Series 35 are: HSBC Bank PLC (Aa2/AA-), Hutchison Whampoa
Limited (A3/A-), MTR Corporation Limited (Aa2/AA), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (A1/A),
Standard Chartered Bank (A3/A), Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited (A1/A) and Swire Pacific Limited
(A3/A-). The credit ratings shown next to each reference entity are those applicable to the reference
obligation as on 11 January 2008–shortly before the minibond is issued, as published by Moody’s
Investors Service and/or Standard & Poor’s.
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In the best scenario, investor will get a 20% return when the note matures. However,
when the stock price of any linked companies falls below 75% of the fixing price on any
day within the 2.5 years, investor will have to wait until the maturity date to get back
the principal investment. Moreover, when default of the underlying collateral or swap
counterparty occurs, the note will also have to be redeemed early at an amount based
on the proceeds of selling the collateral, which may be significantly below the principal.
Unlike those structured products examined by Henderson and Pearson (2008), retail
structured financial products are not listed on any exchange in Hong Kong. All trans-
actions are executed over the counter at distributing banks. Once issued, most of the
structured products are not priced until maturity or when knock-out events, such as
credit event for CLNs, occur. There is no way to track the performance and market
value of such products. Hence, it is difficult for retail investors to form expectation
about the risks and returns of such products. There is no secondary market for those
products. Initial investors likely have to hold the products till maturity. The relatively
long maturity, 3 to 5.5 years for CLNs and 2 years for ELNs, makes investment in such
products even riskier. Overall, it seems difficult for investors to get a good handle of such
investments. We use survey data to explore the key motives for investors to purchase
these products.
4 Data and Sample Description
4.1 Data Collection
We collect data from investors of Lehman related structured products through individual
interviews. The interviewers are University of Hong Kong students, mostly Cantonese
speakers. The interview will go over a list of items on a questionnaire designed by our-
selves. The interviews were conducted during the 11 times of the large protests and
gatherings by investors between January 15 and June 18, 2009. Our sample consists
of data from 783 structured product investors. The interviewers randomly selected the
interviewees and asked questions face-to-face. Our questionnaire has three sections: in-
vestment decision environment, investor financial background, and investor demographic
characteristics. On March 14, 2009, we revised our questionnaire by adding questions on
family monthly income, homeownership, whether they are familiar with salesman, and
a question on simple calculation, without changing the original questions. The sample
is roughly evenly distributed: 430 investors surveyed before March 14 and 353 investors
surveyed after March 14, 2009.
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In order to examine sample selection issue, we further interviewed a group of in-
vestors who did not invest in Lehman related structured products as control sample.
Those interviews were conducted between July 24 and August 10, 2009. We used simi-
lar questionnaire, with minor change on the questions in investment decisions. We chose
to conduct the surveys in 11 districts of Hong Kong where most of the Lehman struc-
tured product investors live to control for geographic factors. We randomly selected
75 investors in those areas, such as from streets, parks, or from railway stations, and
obtained similar information on demographic, financial, and investment characteristics.
Figure 4 illustrates a pattern of co-movement between total investments in minibonds
from the subjects in our sample and Hang Seng Index (HSI), the stock market index in
Hong Kong, from July 2, 2003 to June 30, 2008. Presumably investors have more to
invest in structured products when equity market condition is good. Notably, as shown
in Appendix III, the largest group comes from investors of minibond series 35B issued on
February 22, 2008, at a time financial crisis was going strong. However, as by Souleles
(2009) that when market condtion goes down, investors are more likely to shun away
from purchasing securities for the purpose of hedging.
4.2 Sample Description
Table I presents descriptive statistics of our key variables (definitions are given in Ap-
pendix I). Respondents report the name of the structured products they purchased and
the proportion of their total financial wealth that they invested in the structured prod-
ucts. Their average monthly income is HKD17,700. On average, each investor made
HKD1.04 million (59% of wealth) investment in such products. Only 31% of the sub-
jects ever bought lottery tickets., 40% of them buy stocks with average holding of 15%,
82% own properties. About 62% of the investors were familiar with the salespeople,
86% investors closed the deal on the spot while 14% took the documents back home and
purchased after some consideration. About 42%, 38%, 9% investors purchased through
Bank of China (Hong Kong). Interestingly, when we compare our sample with two major
survey sample in Hong Kong10, we find that investors in our sample are in general older
and contains more women than men. But in terms of education and financial charac-
teristics, investors in our sample are quite similar to the other two samples. Appendix
II reports the details of this comparison.
10“2006 Population By-census” report conducted by Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department
from July to August 2006, and “Retail Investor Survey 2009” conducted by Hong Kong Exchange and
Cleaning Limited from November to December 2009.
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Our sample contains all of the three main structured products that are related to
Lehman Brothers, namely Minibond, Constellation and equity-linked notes (ELN here-
after). The differences between ELN investors and CLN investors are substantial. ELN
investors are better educated, with 2 more years of education on average, and more afflu-
ent than CLN investors in both total financial wealth and family monthly income. The
average self-reported investment proportions by investors of each group are all above
50%. Financial and demographic characteristics show that these investors are basically
senior and poorly educated people. The average age is above 55; more than 70% of them
are retired, and only 15% attended college. More than a quarter of the investors cannot
read, and about two thirds of them cannot do simple calculation.
A key variable to our analysis is investor’s self-reported expectation of Hong Kong
stock market annual return which we use as a proxy for financial literacy. Among the
353 interviewees we asked for their expectation, 159 cannot answer. The histogram of
answers from the other 194 investors is plotted in Figure 5. Unsurprisingly, investors
tend to choose sentimental numbers such as 0% (25 responses), 5% (30 responses), 10%
(48 responses), 20% (20 responses), but there is also wide dispersion among the answers.
Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the wealth invested in structured financial products is
high in groups sorted on their stock return expectation. The investment proportions are
all higher than 50%. However, those who can give more reasonable expectation to Hong
Kong stock market annual return (the third group) on average put less proportion of
wealth in purchasing structured financial products.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows that the proportion of financially literate investors de-
creases as the investors’ investment proportion increases. Among those who have in-
vested less than half of their wealth in structured products, there are significantly more
literate investors than non-literate investors. However, this difference decreased and re-
versed in the group of people who invested more than half of their wealth in structured
products. Panel C of Figure 6 shows that investment proportion in structured products
first increase and then decrease as we move from low income investors to high income in-
vestors. Investors of middle income level invest more proportion of wealth in structured
products. Within each group, the financially illiterate investors invest more proportion
of their wealth than literate investors.
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5 Empirical Results on Allocation
5.1 Fundamental Determinants
Conventional mean-variance portfolio allocation theories suggest that investment deci-
sion in risky assets θ is determined by
θ =
E(µ)− rf
γσ
, (1)
where E(µ)−rf is risk premium or expected return over risk-free rate, σ is risk, and γ is
investor risk aversion. Investment proportion increases with risk premium but decreases
with risk. More risk averse investors will allocate less to risky assets. When we adapt
above predictions to structured notes, we need to have a precise mapping to conventional
investments according to description of product characteristics. In particular, structured
notes mostly are linked to multiple names with different credit ratings. The number of
reference names and their ratings can be informative of the risk and return of the CLNs
and ELNs.
Specifically, we consider the premium of the product over Libor rate. The highest
rating of the reference entities as well as the lowest rating of the reference entities,
resulting a rating range (Max-Min rating). The maturity of the product is used to
capture the term structure in premium and liquidity clientele effects. Furthermore,
number of reference entities and coupon payment frequency are often emphasized in the
product prospectus. The products are either denominated in Hong Kong dollar or U.S.
dollar. We separate CLNs from ELNs.
Additional to security’s risk and return and investor’s risk appetite, factors related
to investment environment may also affect asset allocation decisions. In particular, we
consider the relationship between distributing bank and investor to capture the trust
effect. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show that less trusting investors buy less
stocks using Italian and Dutch data. Trust is measured in three ways: a dummy variable
which equals one if the investor has ten years or longer relationship with the distributing
bank, investor’s self report trust (from 1 to 5) level at the time of purchase, a discrete
variable which equals 3 if the salesperson is a personal friend of the investor, 2 if the
investor is acquainted with the salesperson, and 1 if investor did not have previous
interaction with the salesperson.
We also consider other factors such as market conditions and investment oppor-
tunities which intertemporal asset pricing models such as Merton (1973) suggest are
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important. Specifically, we consider Hong Kong Interbank Borrowing Rate (Hibor) for
credit market condition and Hang Seng index trailing quarterly return for general eq-
uity market condition. These macroeconomic variables may also account for some of the
effect of investor sentiment and information uncertainty.
Table II reports our baseline results on fundamental determinants of structured prod-
uct allocation. In model 1, we include only product characteristics capturing the risk,
return, and type of the security. We find that investors allocate more to structured prod-
ucts with more frequent coupon payments and wider range of reference entities. The
latter finding is puzzling as products with wider range are riskier. It may seem surprising
that investors’ allocation does not depend on the premium. However, this is expected
result in equilibrium of successful marketing strategy. The issuers will offer minimum
return in order to fully capture consumer surplus. Overall, the low 0.025 adjusted R2
indicate that overall investors pay little attention to product characteristics analyzed.
In model 2, we consider investor background. We proxy investor risk aversion by
lottery purchase frequency. Other variables such as age, retirement status, income,
wealth, home ownership, gender, marital status could also be related to risk aversion or
background risk (susceptibility to liquidity shocks). We find that higher income earners
and home owners are less likely to buy structured products. The economic significance
is high for the home ownership status. Moreover, a group of investors cannot recall the
details (purchase date and security type) of their investment. This group may be less
careful but this variable is insignificant. In aggregate, investor background has more
explanatory power than product characteristics with adjusted R2 of 0.043.
In model 3, we analyze transaction environment. We find that investors trusting
the distributor more and more familiar with the salespeople bought significantly less.
Whether investors bought on the spot or reconsidered has no effect. Bank relationship
is not important. Although a large group of investors bought from Bank of China, those
investors did not allocate more in structured products. In model 4, we examine the
effects of market condition or investment opportunity. We find credit market condition
characterized by Hibor rate and equity market condition characterized by Hang Seng
index 3-month trailing return are insignificant in explaining investment proportion.
In model 5, we combine the effects of product risk-return profile and investor pref-
erence. In the presence of investor background variables, rating range of the reference
names become insignificant. In model 6, we consider all above variables. Furthermore,
coupon paying frequency becomes insignificant. The adjusted R2 in the regression of
full set of explanatory variables is merely 0.069. In summary, our theorized variables
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explain little of the investment decisions.
5.2 Effects of Distributors’ Selling Intensity
Results from previous analysis suggest that it is difficult to tell a demand story for
investments in structured products. To further directly examine the supply effect, we
consider the distributing banks’ selling intensity by the initiator of the transaction and
the procedure of the transaction. If bank salespeople initiate the transaction, they are
more likely to be the pursuer of the transaction and actively maneuver deal closing.
Investors are more likely to be passive buyers. In addition, the government requires
a risk profile evaluation for qualification of structured product investment. If bank
salespeople neglect, most likely purposefully, the risk evaluation, then the selling side is
aggressively completing the transaction. We find supporting evidence as shown in Table
III. In model 1 and model 2, we find that investors buy more structured products if
the transactions are initiated by banks instead of by investors. In model 1, we control
for investors’ demographic background and find that investors buy 11.8 percent more of
structured products if distributing banks initiate transaction. When further controlling
for transaction environment, product characteristics and market condition, the effect of
bank initiate transactions increases to 14.3 percent, and the adjusted R2 increases to
0.087.
In model 3, we control for investor background and examine the effect that banks
do not evaluate investors’ risk profile. In our sample, about half of investors claim
that the distributing banks did not evaluate their risk profile, and half of them claim
did. Investors who do not get evaluations of their risk profile invest 8.3 percent more
in structured products than those who get evaluated and noticed of their risk profile.
When further controlling for transaction environment, product characteristics, and mar-
ket condition, our result of no risk profile evaluation persists, as shown in model 4. By
adding no risk profile evaluation, the adjusted R2 jumped to 0.086, which is similar with
that of adding bank initiate transaction.
In model 5, we combine the effects of the two selling intensity measures and control for
the variables from investors’ demand side. We find that both measures of selling intensity
are positively significant. When bank salespeople approach the buyers for investments
in structured product, investors allocate 15.5 percent more into such products. If risk
evaluation is not done before closing the deal, investment will be 6.6 percent bigger.
Moreover, these two measures of selling intensity increase the adjusted R2 further to
0.108. In summary, the distributing banks’ selling intensity has significantly affected
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investors’ decision making to buy more structured products.
5.3 Financial Literacy and Investment Decision
Above evidence suggests that investments in structured products may not represent in-
vestors’ best desire, but are more likely to be “pulled” by the issuers. Then the follow-up
question is, will financial literacy be effective in attenuating the influence from the sup-
ply side? In Table IV, we use investor’s stock market expectation to measure financial
literacy. The premise is that financially literate investors should be able to form reason-
able expectation about stock returns. Our first hypothesis is that if financial literacy
matters, then more financially literate investors’ behavior should more conform to the-
oretical predictions. We find supporting evidence as shown in Panel A of Table IV. In
models 1-4, we observe that for literate investors whose stock market return expectation
is within (5%, 50%) range, allocation decreases with maturity and increase with payment
frequency. Married investors invested 31% – 37% less in structured products. the results
are very different for financially illiterate investors presented in models 5-8. Illiterate
investors put more in products with wider rating range. the income and homeowner-
ship effects exist for illiterate investors. Marital status has positive effect. Transaction
environment is important for financially illiterate investors. Lastly, the R2’s are in big
contrast, 18.1% for literate investors in model 3 versus 4.4% for illiterate investors in
model 7.
Next we directly measure the effect of financial literacy using it as an independent
variable. The results are presented in Panel B of Table IV. In models 1 to 5, we define an
investor as financially literate if her expected stock market return is within the (5%, 50%)
range as in Panel A. We find that indeed, more financially literate investors purchased
about 12% less structured products, without controlling for other determinants, as shown
in model 1. It also has impressive R2 of 3.8%. In model 2, we control for product
characteristics and investor background. In model 3, we also control for transaction
environment and market condition. The effect of literacy remains significant although
the magnitude of its effect is slightly reduced.
Some may question our measure of financial literacy as it is associated with stock
market. It is plausible that investors’ awareness of stock market investment opportunities
may invest less in structured products. In order to control this investment opportunity
possibility, we use the subsample of investors who do not participate in stock market
in model 4, possibly for risk considerations. We find that the effect of financial literacy
is even stronger. All else equal, more financially literate non-stock market participants
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invest 13% less in structured products. Furthermore, we use a more stringent definition
of financial literacy. Average stock market return in the past few years in Hong Kong is
within the range of (7%, 17%). Hence, an investor with expectation within such range is
likely considerably knowledgeable of financial markets. We repeat the analysis in models
5 to 8 and find similar results.
Financially literate investors will put some of their investments in risky assets includ-
ing stocks. Hence, we use risky asset market participation to define financial literacy
in models 1 to 3 of Table V and stock market participation in models 4 to 6. We find
similar supporting evidence that financially literate investors purchase less structured
products. It is worth pointing out that the effect from financial literacy drives out other
effects except trust in distributing bank.
Literacy has multiple facets. According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, literacy refers to “the condition or quality of being knowledgeable in
a particular subject or field.” The defining characteristic of literacy is the ability to read
and write. In Table VI we examine investors’ calculating ability and comprehension. We
find that both components are important individually, even after controlling for financial
literacy and other variables as shown in models 1 to 7. Moreover, they have substantially
more explanatory power relative to other variables. Stand-alone adjusted R2s are 4.5%
for calculation and 9.7% for comprehension. However, counter-intuitively, comprehen-
sion rather than calculation seems to be relatively more important as demonstrated in
model 8. Financial literacy is still significant after controlling calculation and compre-
hension. Hence, financial literacy may reach beyond conventional literacy measured by
cognitive abilities. The importance of literacy, calculation, and comprehension is further
demonstrated by the increased adjusted R2 from 0.069 to 0.185. Additionally, investor
income and home ownership become insignificant in the presence of literacy variables.
5.4 Effects of Education and IQ
If financial literacy has significant effect on investment performance, improving investor
financial literacy through education programs seems to be a promising route to pursue.
However, the result may not be encouraging if literacy is mostly determined by individual
intelligence which cannot be materially affected by training. Ehrlich, Hamlen, and Yin
(2008) use micro-level data to show that more educated households invest more in risky
assets and obtain higher returns. Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2009b) show
that IQ affects stock market performance. In this subsection, we separately explore
these two potential drivers of literacy effects.
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Table VII model 1 shows that investors with high school or above education bought
14% less structured products on average. The magnitude of this education dummy
is slightly reduced to 11% after controlling for product and investor background as
in models 2 and 3. Furthermore, the effect of education is accumulative, as shown
in models 4 to 8 when we measure education by the number of schooling years. This
negative relationship between education and structured product investment prevails after
controlling for other effects. Education effect is robust to controlling for literacy and
its two components calculation and comprehension as in model 8. However, marginal
explanatory power of education is limited as adjusted R2 is little changed with the
inclusion of education. Although education has a stand-alone adjusted R2 of 0.06, its
effects probably correlate with other variables. Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009) show
that even highly educated people can be susceptive to suboptimal investment choices.
Education may not be able to eliminate all frictions preventing investors from optimizing.
Probably financial education with specific objectives will be more helpful.
Notwithstanding the strong education effect in Table VII, the casuality is unclear as
smarter people tend to perform better in school and get more education opportunity.
However, we do not have direct measure of IQ to put in as control variables. In order
to examine the effect of IQ, we construct several indirect measures. First, if a person
attended high school or college but still has limited reading skills, we presume such
person has low IQ. However, we are aware of self-reporting accuracy issue. Hence, we
also define people without much schooling but can read as high IQ. Additional measures
with intermediate groups are also used. The specific classification is included in Table
VIII. From correlation matrix in Panel B of Table I, we see that our IQ proxy is highly
correlated with comprehension (correlation coefficient 0.86).
The effect of IQ is report in Table IX. We find very strong relationship between IQ
and investment. High IQ investors purchase 16% to 24% less structured products as
shown by models 1 to 4 in Panel A where we separate low IQ from others. We focus on
high IQ group in models 5 to 8. Results are similar when we use finer measures of IQ
in Panel B of Table IX. Our finding that high IQ investors participate less in structured
products (hence suffer less) is consistent with Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa
(2009a, 2009b). Furthermore, both education and IQ are significant jointly, after con-
trolling for product characteristics, investor background, etc. However, the incremental
R2 is minimal. It is interesting to note that high IQ, well educated, and (relatively)
financially literate investors still purchase structured products.
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6 Robustness Checks and Alternative Interpretations
Our above results on financial literacy, education, and IQ could be driven by a specific
group of investors or product. In this section, we explore whether those effects vary
across different sample selection criterion. By doing so we can verify the robustness of
our prior findings as well as explore new implications within subgroups.
6.1 CLN vs ELN
Credit-linked notes and equity-linked notes could be very different securities. Some
may argue that CLNs investors are more conservative as CLNs resemble several fea-
tures of bonds. ELNs investors are more likely experienced investors with prior stock
investments. As we see from summary Table I, ELNs bear much higher premium than
CLNs. ELN investors are better educated with higher income. Hence, we separate CLNs
investors from ELNs investors.
Table X shows that there are indeed salient difference across CLNs and ELNs. Liter-
acy effect is only significant for ELN investors. Male ELN investors bought 10% to 14%
less CLNs. Older ELN investors bought less. These age, gender, and literacy effects only
exist for ELNs investors. Notably, older ELN investors made less investments. There-
fore, CLN investments are more likely to be “pulled” by the issuer rather than “pushed”
by individual household investors. Note that education, IQ, and comprehension are still
significant for both groups.
For the subsample of CLNs, the rating range (max-min rating) is no longer significant.
Investors bought less high premium CLNs and shun away from CLNs with more reference
entities, after controlling for other effects. Household hold more U.S. dollar denominated
CLNs. If the investor bought under ‘consideration’, allocation proportion is about 7%
higher. Hence, investors could use some simple measures to make investment decisions.
However, the adjusted R2 is still below 0.20. Note that the negative premium effect is
highly consistent with issuer “pulling” effect.
6.2 Age and Wealth
We separate into different wealth groups and age groups. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003)
discuss whether irrational behavior would disappear with wealth. Korniotis and Kumar
(2009) examine the role of age in investment performance. Literacy, education, and
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IQ may play different role under different conditions. Indeed, as shown in Panel A of
Table XI, we find that literacy, education, and IQ effects are stronger for the group
of investors aged 50 and above. Those effects are insignificant for investors below 50.
For the younger investors, currency and income are stronger. Notably, the R2s are
much higher for younger investor group than the older group (highest R2 29.4% versus
15.9%). This result can be consistent with Korniotis and Kumar (2009) who find that
aging has adverse effect on investment performance, although older people may gain
from experience.
According to Panel B of Table XI, literacy is significant for the most wealth group
but not for the highest earners. Education and IQ effects are significant for both wealthy
and low income households. Among the high income group (income in 20,000 to 99,999),
structured product investment proportion increase with lottery buying frequency. For
income below 20,000 group, the income effect is positive and significant. The most
wealthy quartile, male investors bought 23% less. Wealthy investors put less in struc-
tured products when they bought through Bank of China Hong Kong. The R2s are
substantially higher for wealthy group and high income earners. This result can be
consistent with the conjecture that high income earners and wealthy investors can more
easily overcome participation costs in overall markets.
For the total sample, income still has a strong negative effect on investment propor-
tion in structured products while age has no effect. This result can be consistent with
Wachter and Yogo’s (2009) Life-cycle model, which predicts that richer households will
invest more share of wealth in stocks, but the share is relatively stable in their age.
6.3 Determinants of Financial Literacy
In Table XII, we attempt to understand the driving factors of financial literacy. We
find that investors’ demographic background has little explanatory power with pseudo
R2 equal to 0.027. Adding education and calculation increases the pseudo R2 to 0.043
and 0.105. Calculation also have a very high z-score. Other significant determinants are
retirement status, which is likely correlated with age, and home ownership. Although at
a low significance level, male investors seem to be more financially literate than female
investors. Surprisingly, IQ and comprehension are not related to literacy. When add
together, proposed explanatory variables for literary are generates pseudo R2 as high as
0.11.
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6.4 Heckman Selection Model with Control Sample
We realize that our sample may not be random. In order to control for selection bias,
we use Heckman two-stage analysis. We include subjects who did not buy structured
products in the first stage analysis to calculate the selection probability (Mills lambda),
which is then included in the second stage analysis of investment in structured products.
From Table XIII, we find that effects of literacy, comprehension, education, and IQ are
robust to the selection bias.
It is interesting that in the selection model, less educated household with low lottery
purchase frequency are more likely to be structured product investors. Female, low calcu-
lation capability, married investors are more likely to be structured products investors.
Investors more familiar with salespeople are more likely to buy structured products.
Homeowners are more likely to be investors. The selection model is reasonably well
specified with pseudo R2 of 0.469. However, some of the variables in the selection model
have opposite effects in the analysis of investment proportion. For example, more trust-
ing investors are more likely to be investors, but conditioning on investing, they put less
in structured products. Similarly, households more familiar with salespeople are more
likely to be approached but invest less. Homeowners are more likely to invest but invest
less in proportion. The inverse Mills ratio from the selection model is highly significant
with a negative sign. Therefore, selection effect is indeed at work. But our main findings
are robust to sample selection.
7 Summary and Conclusion
Individual investors in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore bought substantial amount of
structured products which turned out to be CDOs in disguise, as revealed by the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. It is difficult to justify initial investment deci-
sions in retail structured products from standard rational theories as those investors had
little prior knowledge. We show that product distributors’ selling intensity is an impor-
tant determinant for investors’ allocation in structured products. On the other hand,
more financially literate investors, who are more capable of optimizing asset allocation,
include less structured products into their portfolios. Important determinants accord-
ing to mean-variance analysis, such as product premium, have little explanatory power
to investor’s allocation decisions. Our finding suggests that investments in structured
products prior to the credit crisis were more likely to be pulled by distributors.
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This paper also demonstrates the importance of financial literacy for investment de-
cisions. Consistent with prior studies, our evidence suggests that improving investor
financial literacy through education could be important for the future of financial in-
novations. However, more vigilant market monitoring by regulators may be equally
important.
Our findings have important implications for the ongoing debate on root causes of
the credit crisis in 2007-2009. If investors did not knowingly pursue investments in
structured products, the investment banks manufacturing such products are more likely
to be the culprit of the market development and the amplification of the crisis.
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Figure 1: Overview of structured product market from 2002 to 2009.
This figure shows the gross sales of structured products to retail clients from 2002 to
2009 in Europe, Asia Pacific, North America, and Hong Kong. Data is provided by
www.structuredretailproduct.com. We only have sales data from 2006 to 2009 for North Amer-
ica due to limited access to their data base.
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Figure 2: Structure of credit-linked notes and equity-linked notes. The first fig-
ure shows the structure of Credit-Linked Notes taking Minibond Series 35 as an example. The
7 institutions taken as reference entity of minibond series 35 reported below the figure. The
credit ratings shown next to each reference entity are those applicable to the reference obli-
gation as on 11 January 2008–shortly before the minibond is issued, as published by Moody’s
Investors Service and/or Standard & Poor’s. The second figure shows the structure of Equity-
Linked Notes (ELN) taking Pyxis ELN Series 21 as an example. The 6 HK-listed securities
are: Air China Limited, China Communications Construction Company Limited, China Mo-
bile Limited, Esprit Holdings Limited, Li & Fung Limited, and Ping An Insurance (Group)
Company of China, Ltd.
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Figure 3: Payoff Structure of Equity-Linked Notes if No Early Termination
Occurs. This figure shows the payoff structure of Equity-Linked Notes by taking Pyxis Series
21 issued on 28 May 2007 as an example. This figure is taken directly from the prospectus
of Pyxis Series 21. The investment horizon for the note is 2.5 years. Coupon will be paid
every half a year after issuance at the observation dates. There are four auto-calls by the
issuer on each of the second to the fifth observation dates. Valuation date is equal to the
fifth observation date-about 2.5 years after issue date. When the swap between issuer and
swap counterparty is terminated prior to maturity date, the note will be redeemed at a price
based on the proceeds of selling the underlying collateral, which may be significantly below the
principal of the note. For Pyxis Series 21, the underlying collateral is European Medium-Term
Notes issued by Lehman Brothers Treasury Co. B.V.
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Figure 4: Market Performance and Minibond Investment. This figure shows the
relation of total investment in each series of Minibond in our sample and Hang Seng Index. The
time line starts from July 2, 2003 to June 30, 2008. There are 637 observations of Minibond
investors. Those who purchased multiple series have been counted multiple times. The red
circle spots on the HSI line illustrate the date when each series of Minibond were issued.
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Figure 5: Distribution of expectation about stock annual return. This figure
shows the distribution of investors’ expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return.
We surveyed 783 investors who have purchased Credit-linked notes or/and Equity-linked notes
from February 2003 to May 2008 in Hong Kong, and randomly picked 353 of them to tell
their expectations about Hong Kong stock market annual return. 194 investors responded
as a percentage; the other 159 investors claimed that they cannot answer this question. We
further constructed two dummy variables, “Literate Proxy1” and “Literate Proxy2”, as proxies
for been financially “Literate”. “Literate Proxy1” equals to 1 if the investor’s expectation to
Hong Kong stock market annual return lies between 5.1% and 50%; ”Literate Proxy2” equals
to 1 if the investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return lies between 7%
and 17%.
36
Figure 6: Financial Literacy and Investment Proportion. Panel A shows the av-
erage investment proportion of investors in 4 groups separated by their expectation to Hong
Kong stock market annual return. The four groups are: 1. cannot answer the question; 2.
expectation to stock annual return below 5.1%; 3. expectation to stock annual return between
5.1% and 50%; 4. expectation to stock annual return above 50%. Panel B compares the com-
position of literate investors in four investment proportion groups and composition of illiterate
investors in four investment proportion groups. Investor is regarded as financially ”Literate”
if his/her expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return lies between 5.1% and 50%.
The sample size of both Panel A and Panel B is 311. Panel C categorizes literate investors and
illiterate investors by their household income level, and compares their investment proportion
in structured products in each group. There are in all 312 observations in this sample. The
factor of income ranges from 0 HKD to 125,000HKD.
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Table I
Sample Summary Descriptives
This table reports the summary statistics of our survey sample. The data for our sample were collected by questionnaire
survey on Hong Kong investors who had purchased credit-linked note or/and equity-linked note from February 2003 to
May 2008. We conducted the survey from January 15 to June 18, 2009, and obtained 783 responses. Panel A reports
the summary statistics. The data for “Financially Literate”, “Monthly Income”, “Own House”, “Familiar with Sales”,
were obtained only after March 14, 2009. “Financially Literate” is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if investor’s
expectation about annual return of Hong Kong stock market is between 5.1% to 51%. “Financially Literate (Proxy
2)” is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if investor’s expectation about annual return of Hong Kong stock market
is between 7% to 17%. “Loyal Client of Distributing Banks” is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the investor has
a relation with the distributing banks for more than 10 years. “Trust in Distributing Banks” scales from 1 to 5 with
1 meaning investor completely suspected the distributing banks when he/she bought the structured product, and 5
meaning he/she completed trust the distributing banks. “Buy Multiple Times” is a dummy variable with 1 given to
investors who purchased more than one structured products. Panel B reports the correlation matrix of all the key
variable used in our analysis. A detailed instruction of the definition of each variable is provided in Appendix I, and
a comparison of our sample and two major survey sample was reported in Appendix II.
Panel A: Sample Summary Statistics by Type of Invested Products
Variables Minibond Constellation ELN Total
Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs
Investment Outcome:
Investment Proportion 0.60 420 0.56 73 0.60 126 0.59 693
Investment(HK$mn) 0.91 456 0.67 80 1.74 144 1.04 767
Investment Characteristics:
Financially Literate 0.16 231 0.24 33 0.17 30 0.18 353
Financially Literate (Proxy 2) 0.28 231 0.39 33 0.27 30 0.29 353
Buy Lottery 0.29 435 0.39 75 0.29 137 0.31 727
Risk Premium of Product 3.81 464 3 80 9.83 146 4.98 783
Reconsider 0.16 442 0.05 77 0.11 129 0.14 732
Loyal Client of Distributing Banks 0.57 456 0.46 76 0.41 140 0.53 757
Trust in Distributing Banks 4.81 228 4.87 31 4.93 28 4.81 339
Familiar with Sales 0.67 225 0.56 32 0.38 26 0.62 335
Buy from Bank of China 0.42 464 0.38 80 0.09 146 0.34 783
Financial Characteristics:
Wealth(HK$mn) 1.80 417 1.95 73 4.76 125 2.36 688
Monthly Income(median HK$10,000) 1.61 203 1.39 33 2.52 25 1.77 312
Own House 0.81 196 0.81 32 0.92 24 0.82 303
Saving Proportion 0.67 344 0.59 57 0.72 94 0.68 566
Stock Proportion 0.14 344 0.28 57 0.13 94 0.15 566
Buy Stock 0.39 344 0.60 57 0.46 94 0.4 566
Buy Risky Assets 0.39 464 0.49 80 0.35 146 0.38 783
Buy Multiple Times 0.30 451 0.25 73 - 0 0.29 526
Demographic Characteristics:
Age 56.04 459 53.51 78 54.42 145 55.53 773
Male 0.38 432 0.33 69 0.33 114 0.37 700
Retired 0.77 457 0.85 75 0.71 140 0.76 762
Married 0.83 432 0.77 65 0.85 143 0.83 725
Years of Education 9.66 451 9.97 79 11.52 142 10.14 761
Some/finished College 0.11 451 0.10 79 0.26 142 0.15 761
Some/finished High School 0.54 451 0.59 79 0.75 142 0.59 761
Comprehension 0.61 454 0.72 78 0.73 142 0.65 764
Calculation 0.31 227 0.33 33 0.38 29 0.34 348
Number of Observations - 464 - 80 - 146 - 783
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Table II
Economic Determinants of Investment Decision
This table shows the effects of the traditional and behavioral economic factors on investor’s decision on how much
proportion of wealth to be invested in structured products. “Premium” is the risk premium of the purchased security.
“Max Rating” is the maximal credit rating of reference obligation, with 9 given to AAA and 1 given to BBB.
“#Reference Entity” is the number of reference entity. “Coupon Freq.” is the frequency of coupon payment, with
1/12, 1/4, 1/2 represents monthly, quarterly and semi-annually, respectively. “Currency” is a dummy variable with
1 given to U.S. dollar and 0 given to Hong Kong dollar. “Cannot Recall” is a dummy variable with 1 given to the
investors who cannot recall either the name of the security or the date when she/he purchased the security. “Loyal
Client of Distributor” is a dummy variable with 1 given to investors who have relation with the distributing banks for
10 years or more. “Bank of China” is a dummy variable with 1 given to investors who purchase structured products
from Bank of China. “HIBOR” the Hong Kong Inter-Bank Offer Rate at the issue date. “HSI Quarterly Return” is
the quarterly return of Hang Seng Index on the issue date. T statistics are in parentheses, *, ** and *** represent
that p<0.1, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table II-Continue
Independent Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion in Structured Products
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Characteristics
Premium -0.019 -0.014 -0.013
(-1.06) (-0.78) (-0.67)
Max Rating -0.006 0.002 -0.008
(-0.22) (0.08) (-0.25)
Max-Min Rating 0.039* 0.033 0.029
-1.71 (1.45) (1.24)
Maturity(years) -0.031 -0.025 -0.016
(-1.22) (-0.95) (-0.61)
#Reference Entity -0.028 -0.022 -0.014
(-1.19) (-0.96) (-0.53)
Coupon Freq. 0.436* 0.488* 0.438
(1.69) (1.89) (1.58)
Currency 0.047 0.036 0.049
(1.50) (1.16) (1.56)
ELN Dummy -0.083 -0.038 -0.054
(-0.63) (-0.29) (-0.38)
Investor Background
Buy Lottery 0.022 0.037 0.019
(0.56) (0.9) (0.44)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.18) (-0.10) (-0.05)
Retired -0.024 -0.023 -0.009
(-0.54) (-0.51) (-0.21)
Income -0.023** -0.027*** -0.026**
(-2.30) (-2.70) (-2.52)
Own House -0.096** -0.093** -0.087*
(-2.12) (-2.03) (-1.79)
Male -0.054 -0.057 -0.065
(-1.42) (-1.46) (-1.59)
Married -0.029 0.011 -0.028
(-0.53) (0.19) (-0.46)
Cannot Recall -0.113 -0.036 -0.016
(-0.98) (-0.29) (-0.10)
Transaction Environment
Reconsider 0.008 0.012
(0.16) (0.25)
Loyal Client of Distributor 0.046 0.034
(1.2) (0.85)
Trust in Distributor -0.074** -0.092**
(-1.99) (-2.44)
Familiar with Sales -0.075** -0.068*
(-1.99) (-1.73)
Bank of China -0.019 -0.044
(-0.55) (-1.19)
Market Condition
HIBOR -0.015 -0.003
(-1.11) (-0.17)
HSI Quarterly -0.001 -0.002
Return (-0.72) (-1.03)
Constant 0.774*** 0.798*** 0.986*** 0.647*** 0.792*** 1.289***
#Obs. 250 247 244 252 245 237
Adj.R2 0.025 0.043 0.014 0.002 0.066 0.069
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Table III
Selling Intensity and Investment Decision
This table reports the effect of distributing banks’ selling intensity on investors’ decision making. “Bank Initiate
Transaction” is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if investors’ purchase is initiated by banks, and equals to 0 if
investors knowingly go to banks to purchase structured products. “No Risk Profile Evaluation” is a dummy variable
which equals to 1 if banks did not evaluate investors’ risk profile or created the profile without noticing investors when
selling structured products to the investors, and equals to 0 if banks evaluated and noticed investors about their risk
profile.
Independent Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion in Structured Products
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank Initiated Transaction 0.118* 0.143** 0.155**
(1.96) (2.31) (2.48)
No Risk Profile Evaluation 0.083** 0.070* 0.066*
(2.37) (1.95) (1.85)
Transaction Environment
Trust in Distributor -0.095** -0.090** -0.093**
(-2.54) (-2.39) (-2.51)
Familiar with Sales -0.073* -0.069* -0.075*
(-1.87) (-1.77) (-1.94)
Reconsider 0.015 0.010 0.016
(0.31) (0.20) (0.31)
Loyal Client of Distributor 0.024 0.029 0.017
(0.61) (0.71) (0.43)
Bank of China -0.042 -0.044 -0.042
(-1.17) (-1.21) (-1.15)
Investor Background
Buy Lottery 0.016 0.014 0.027 0.020 0.017
(0.41) (0.34) (0.68) (0.48) (0.40)
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.32) (-0.10) (-0.31) (-0.13) (-0.14)
Retired -0.024 -0.008 -0.018 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.54) (-0.19) (-0.41) (-0.05) (-0.06)
Income -0.023** -0.026** -0.023** -0.025** -0.025**
(-2.39) (-2.56) (-2.39) (-2.48) (-2.51)
Own House -0.093** -0.083* -0.103** -0.089* -0.086*
(-2.06) (-1.73) (-2.24) (-1.85) (-1.81)
Male -0.058 -0.071* -0.052 -0.058 -0.065
(-1.50) (-1.77) (-1.36) (-1.43) (-1.62)
Married -0.026 -0.021 -0.029 -0.032 -0.024
(-0.46) (-0.34) (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.39)
Cannot Recall -0.063 -0.024 -0.108 -0.018 -0.027
(-0.51) (-0.15) (-0.94) (-0.11) (-0.17)
Control for Product Character No Yes No Yes Yes
Control for Market Condition No Yes No Yes Yes
Constant 0.704*** 1.202*** 0.767*** 1.228*** 1.133***
#Obs. 246 237 239 231 231
Adj. R2 0.047 0.087 0.068 0.086 0.108
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Table IV
Financial Literacy and Investment Decision
Panel A reports the effects of economic factors on financially literate and illiterate investors’ investment decision
making. We categorize investors as “Financially Literate Investors” if their expectation about stock annual return
(ESAR) lies between 5.1% and 50%. Panel B reports the effects of financial literacy on investment decision making.
We have constructed two dummy variables as proxies for the investors being “Financially Literate”. In the regressions
at the left side “Financially Literate” equals to 1 if investor’s ESAR lies between 5.1% and 50% (Proxy 1). In the
regressions at the right side, “Financially Literate” equals to 1 if investor’s ESAR lies between 7% and 17% (Proxy
2). In column 4 and 8, we restrict the sample for only stock market non-participants.
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Table IV-Continue
Panel A: Specification by Financial Literacy
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Financially Literate Investors Financially Illiterate Investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Product Characteristics
Premium -0.043 -0.016 -0.029 0.007 0.016 0.018
(-1.37) (-0.50) (-0.81) (0.32) (0.71) (0.78)
Max Rating 0.035 0.034 0.036 -0.045 -0.041 -0.045
(0.74) (0.73) (0.68) (-1.26) (-1.16) (-1.19)
Max-Min Rating 0.017 0.006 -0.004 0.056* 0.057* 0.047
(0.49) (0.18) (-0.09) (1.85) (1.90) (1.55)
Maturity(years) -0.079* -0.045 -0.053 0.009 0.006 0.021
(-1.98) (-1.07) (-1.16) (0.25) (0.16) (0.61)
#Reference Entity -0.012 -0.004 -0.012 -0.01 -0.006 0.007
(-0.28) (-0.10) (-0.22) (-0.35) (-0.23) (0.23)
Coupon Freq. 1.061** 0.851** 0.858* 0.029 0.144 -0.08
(2.6) (2.02) (1.81) (0.09) (0.44) (-0.23)
Currency 0.047 0.041 0.045 0.012 -0.007 0.017
(1.31) (1.15) (1.14) (0.21) (-0.13) (0.28)
ELN Dummy -0.122 -0.144 -0.203 -0.035 -0.034 -0.011
(-0.53) (-0.60) (-0.72) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.07)
Investor Background
Buy Lottery -0.041 -0.001 -0.023 0.053 0.063 0.025
(-0.62) (-0.02) (-0.28) (1.09) (1.25) (0.49)
Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(-1.40) (-1.40) (-0.62) (0.49) (0.57) (0.24)
Retired 0.1 0.088 0.046 -0.067 -0.077 -0.04
(1.13) (0.99) (0.47) (-1.31) (-1.49) (-0.77)
Income -0.021 -0.023 -0.019 -0.027** -0.031** -0.033***
(-1.21) (-1.24) (-0.95) (-2.30) (-2.58) (-2.69)
Own House 0.087 0.076 0.09 -0.103* -0.090* -0.092
(0.97) (0.82) (0.77) (-1.95) (-1.66) (-1.64)
Male -0.016 -0.021 -0.064 -0.057 -0.063 -0.033
(-0.26) (-0.33) (-0.82) (-1.20) (-1.29) (-0.67)
Married -0.373*** -0.309** -0.311** 0.072 0.122* 0.038
(-3.08) (-2.50) (-2.12) (1.13) (1.80) (0.52)
Cannot Recall -0.302 -0.32 - -0.046 -0.043 -0.095
(-1.59) (-1.22)) - (-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.57)
Transaction Environment
Reconsider 0.054 -0.036
(0.52) (-0.63)
Loyal Client 0.005 0.049
of Distributor (0.07) (0.99)
Trust in Distributor 0.001 -0.135***
(0.02) (-2.63)
Familiar with Sales -0.111 -0.078
(-1.41) (-1.61)
Bank of China 0.002 -0.100**
(0.03) (-2.27)
Market Condition
HIBOR -0.005 -0.022
(-0.15) (-0.93)
HSI Quarterly -0.002 0.000
Return (-0.62) (-0.03)
Constant 0.534 1.060*** 0.826 0.946 0.720** 0.692*** 0.608* 1.454***
#Obs. 87 86 85 82 163 161 160 155
Adj.R2 0.116 0.131 0.181 0.105 -0.016 0.043 0.044 0.088
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Table IV-Continue
Panel B: Effects of Financial Literacy
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Financially Literate=1 if ESAR∈[5.1% , 50%]) Financially Literate=1 if ESAR∈[7% , 17%]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Financially Literate -0.118*** -0.084** -0.097** -0.126** -0.102** -0.062 -0.090** -0.153**
(-3.29) (-2.30) (-2.56) (-2.29) (-2.47) (-1.48) (-2.04) (-2.47)
Premium -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.73) (-0.57) (-0.44) (-0.69) (-0.56) (-0.37)
Max Rating 0.002 -0.004 -0.069 0.001 -0.008 -0.075
(0.06) (-0.12) (-1.51) (0.03) (-0.26) (-1.64)
Max-Min Rating 0.029 0.025 0.037 0.031 0.025 0.034
(1.31) (1.08) (1.03) (1.37) (1.09) (0.95)
Maturity(years) -0.023 -0.013 -0.052 -0.023 -0.013 -0.048
(-0.88) (-0.49) (-1.25) (-0.91) (-0.50) (-1.16)
#Reference Entity -0.017 -0.011 -0.004 -0.019 -0.01 0.006
(-0.73) (-0.42) (-0.09) (-0.82) (-0.39) (0.15)
Coupon Freq. 0.502* 0.415 0.536 0.493* 0.426 0.548
(1.97) (1.51) (1.31) (1.92) (1.54) (1.35)
Currency 0.036 0.051 0.063* 0.031 0.044 0.045
(1.16) (1.63) (1.75) (1.01) (1.40) (1.25)
ELN Dummy -0.027 -0.043 -0.148 -0.038 -0.054 -0.122
(-0.21) (-0.30) (-0.70) (-0.29) (-0.38) (-0.58)
Buy Lottery 0.036 0.013 0.026 0.035 0.014 0.025
(0.88) (0.3) (0.44) (0.86) (0.34) (0.42)
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.004
(-0.19) (-0.20) (-1.35) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-1.30)
Retired -0.011 0.007 0.025 -0.015 0.004 0.029
(-0.25) (0.16) (0.43) (-0.34) (0.09) (0.48)
Income -0.026*** -0.024** -0.023 -0.025** -0.023** -0.02
(-2.62) (-2.40) (-1.63) (-2.51) (-2.22) (-1.39)
Own House -0.089* -0.077 -0.042 -0.094** -0.087* -0.049
(-1.96) (-1.62) (-0.65) (-2.05) (-1.81) (-0.76)
Male -0.051 -0.056 -0.02 -0.051 -0.058 -0.017
(-1.31) (-1.38) (-0.33) (-1.31) (-1.42) (-0.29)
Married 0.017 -0.026 0.021 0.007 -0.038 0.008
(0.3) (-0.43) (0.26) (0.12) (-0.63) (0.10)
Cannot Recall -0.058 -0.062 -0.117 -0.048 -0.056 -0.137
(-0.45) (-0.38) (-0.53) (-0.38) (-0.34) (-0.62)
Reconsider 0.004 0.041 0.012 0.044
(0.09) (0.62) (0.25) (0.68)
Loyal Client 0.036 0.039 0.032 0.038
of Distributor (0.91) (0.72) (0.79) (0.71)
Trust in Distributor -0.098*** -0.132** -0.099*** -0.135**
(-2.61) (-2.49) (-2.62) (-2.54)
Familiar with Sales -0.079** -0.072 -0.081** -0.082
(-2.04) (-1.33) (-2.06) (-1.52)
Bank of China -0.051 -0.076 -0.049 -0.061
(-1.40) (-1.49) (-1.33) (-1.21)
HIBOR -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 -0.012
(-0.20) (-0.47) (-0.21) (-0.52)
HSI Quarterly -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
Return (-0.60) (-0.17) (-0.86) (-0.36)
Constant 0.644*** 0.769*** 1.308*** 1.994*** 0.626*** 0.794*** 1.338*** 1.947***
#Obs. 252 245 237 135 252 245 237 135
Adj.R2 0.038 0.083 0.092 0.071 0.02 0.071 0.082 0.078
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Table V
Alternative Measures of Financial Literacy
This table reports the effects of the alternative proxies for financial literacy on investment decision making. In the
regressions at the left side, “Financially Literate” equals to 1 if the investor buys risky assets (stock, bond, and fund).
In the regressions at the right side, “Financially Literate” equals to 1 if the investor buys stock.
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Financially Literate =1 if Investor Buys Risky Assets Financially Literate =1 if Investor Buys Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financially Literate -0.107*** -0.073** -0.06 -0.105*** -0.079** -0.075*
(-3.09) (-2.03) (-1.61) (-2.84) (-2.07) (-1.90)
Premium -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015
(-0.83) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.81)
Max Rating 0.003 -0.008 0.002 -0.009
(0.11) (-0.25) (0.09) (-0.29)
Max-Min Rating 0.033 0.03 0.032 0.029
(1.48) (1.30) (1.41) (1.27)
Maturity(years) -0.022 -0.014 -0.024 -0.017
(-0.85) (-0.53) (-0.95) (-0.63)
#Reference Entity -0.025 -0.019 -0.026 -0.02
(-1.08) (-0.71) (-1.10) (-0.78)
Coupon Freq. 0.447* 0.41 0.461* 0.421
(1.74) (1.48) (1.80) (1.52)
Currency 0.039 0.051 0.037 0.051
(1.25) (1.62) (1.21) (1.61)
ELN Dummy -0.038 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08
(-0.29) (-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.56)
Buy Lottery 0.032 0.016 0.03 0.013
(0.79) (0.37) (0.73) (0.30)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.02)
Retired -0.014 -0.003 -0.02 -0.007
(-0.32) (-0.07) (-0.45) (-0.16)
Income -0.025** -0.024** -0.027*** -0.025**
(-2.56) (-2.34) (-2.72) (-2.47)
Own House -0.076 -0.071 -0.080* -0.072
(-1.65) (-1.46) (-1.73) (-1.47)
Male -0.041 -0.05 -0.045 -0.051
(-1.04) (-1.21) (-1.14) (-1.24)
Married 0.017 -0.02 0.013 -0.025
(0.30) (-0.32) (0.22) (-0.41)
Cannot Recall -0.035 -0.018 -0.033 -0.023
(-0.28) (-0.11) (-0.26) (-0.14)
Reconsider 0.011 0.006
(0.22) (0.13)
Loyal Client 0.033 0.036
of Distributor (0.82) (0.89)
Trust in Distributor -0.087** -0.089**
(-2.29) (-2.36)
Familiar with Sales -0.066* -0.065*
(-1.70) (-1.67)
Bank of China -0.042 -0.045
(-1.15) (-1.24)
HIBOR -0.001 0.000
(-0.03) (0.02)
HSI Quarterly -0.002 -0.002
Return (-1.12) (-1.19)
Constant 0.649*** 0.811*** 1.289*** 0.635*** 0.824*** 1.329***
#Obs. 252 245 237 252 245 237
Adj.R2 0.033 0.079 0.075 0.027 0.079 0.08
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Table VI
General Cognition and Investment Decision
This table shows the effects of investor’s comprehension ability and calculation ability on his/her investment decision
making. Comprehension ability measures how well the investor reads; calculation ability measures whether the investor
can do simple calculation.
Independent Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Calculation -0.125*** -0.084** -0.113*** -0.093** -0.057
(-3.55) (-2.28) (-2.97) (-2.36) (-1.43)
Comprehension -0.181*** -0.157*** -0.167*** -0.157***
(-5.21) (-4.19) (-4.36) (-4.01)
Financially Literate -0.068* -0.086**
(-1.71) (-2.22)
Premium -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.86) (-0.74) (-0.66) (-0.30) (-0.18) (-0.19)
Max Rating -0.007 -0.021 -0.016 0.004 -0.005 -0.01
(-0.25) (-0.69) (-0.53) (0.15) (-0.17) (-0.33)
Max-Min Rating 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.028 0.029
(1.58) (1.55) (1.38) (1.46) (1.24) (1.25)
Maturity(years) -0.024 -0.014 -0.012 -0.017 -0.006 -0.001
(-0.93) (-0.53) (-0.46) (-0.65) (-0.21) (-0.05)
#Reference Entity -0.021 -0.015 -0.013 -0.02 -0.01 -0.008
(-0.88) (-0.59) (-0.50) (-0.90) (-0.38) (-0.34)
Coupon Freq. 0.439* 0.388 0.38 0.362 0.224 0.189
(1.71) (1.41) (1.39) (1.42) (0.81) (0.69)
Currency 0.036 0.048 0.05 0.026 0.043 0.045
(1.17) (1.56) (1.6) (0.88) (1.41) (1.51)
ELN Dummy -0.042 -0.082 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.002
(-0.32) (-0.58) (-0.49) (0.08) (0.07) (-0.01)
Buy Lottery 0.036 0.014 0.011 0.026 0.004 -0.003
(0.89) (0.32) (0.25) (0.66) (0.10) (-0.08)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.02) (-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.33)
Retired -0.029 -0.015 -0.003 -0.037 -0.027 -0.013
(-0.65) (-0.34) (-0.06) (-0.84) (-0.63) (-0.29)
Income -0.023** -0.021** -0.021** -0.019* -0.018* -0.014
(-2.32) (-2.08) (-2.06) (-1.92) (-1.76) (-1.40)
Own House -0.082* -0.065 -0.063 -0.076* -0.06 -0.046
(-1.76) (-1.34) (-1.29) (-1.70) (-1.28) (-0.97)
Male -0.05 -0.051 -0.047 -0.045 -0.049 -0.034
(-1.28) (-1.27) (-1.16) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-0.87)
Married 0.005 -0.032 -0.031 0.005 -0.038 -0.033
(0.09) (-0.50) (-0.48) (0.09) (-0.64) (-0.55)
Cannot Recall -0.016 -0.027 -0.057 -0.069 -0.055 -0.103
(-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.35) (-0.56) (-0.35) (-0.66)
Reconsider 0.007 0.003 -0.005 -0.011
(0.14) (0.05) (-0.10) (-0.23)
Loyal Client 0.018 0.022 0.031 0.021
of Distributor (0.45) (0.55) (0.79) (0.53)
Trust in -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.111***
Distributor (-2.70) (-2.77) (-2.78) (-3.09)
Familiar with -0.06 -0.069* -0.084** -0.085**
Sales (-1.53) (-1.77) (-2.21) (-2.23)
Bank of China -0.058 -0.061* -0.034 -0.049
(-1.60) (-1.66) (-0.96) (-1.39)
HIBOR 0.002 0.001 -0.013 -0.009
(0.14) (0.06) (-0.74) (-0.53)
HSI Quarterly -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Return (-0.93) (-0.64) (-0.81) (-0.49)
Constant 0.648*** 0.849*** 1.422*** 1.412*** 0.711*** 0.829*** 1.413*** 1.499***
#Obs. 249 242 234 234 245 238 230 227
Adj.R2 0.045 0.079 0.097 0.106 0.097 0.142 0.158 0.185
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Table VII
Education and Investment Decision
This table reports the effects of investor’s education on their investment decision making. In the regressions at the left
side, we use dummy variable of whether the investor has entered high school as proxy for investor’s education level.
In the regressions at the right side, we use the investor’s years of education as proxy for his/her education level.
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Education=High School Dummy Education=Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education -0.141*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.009*
(-4.10) (-2.95) (-2.96) (-5.33) (-3.81) (-3.85) (-3.73) (-1.69)
Financially Literate -0.093** -0.084**
(-2.51) (-2.15)
Calculation -0.061
(-1.52)
Comprehension -0.113**
(-2.39)
Buy Lottery 0.026 0.011 0.018 0.002 -0.001 -0.008
(0.64) (0.25) (0.44) (0.04) (-0.03) (-0.19)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.69) (-0.59) (-0.83) (-0.75) (-0.90) (-0.65)
Retired -0.035 -0.022 -0.033 -0.018 -0.003 -0.012
(-0.80) (-0.50) (-0.75) (-0.42) (-0.06) (-0.27)
Income -0.022** -0.021** -0.019* -0.018* -0.017 -0.012
(-2.18) (-2.01) (-1.90) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.21)
Own House -0.058 -0.049 -0.053 -0.043 -0.034 -0.031
(-1.24) (-1.00) (-1.15) (-0.89) (-0.72) (-0.65)
Male -0.05 -0.057 -0.043 -0.049 -0.042 -0.033
(-1.29) (-1.41) (-1.12) (-1.21) (-1.06) (-0.84)
Married 0.019 -0.018 0.019 -0.018 -0.013 -0.014
(0.32) (-0.28) (0.32) (-0.30) (-0.21) (-0.23)
Cannot Recall -0.021 0.007 -0.014 0.001 -0.043 -0.085
(-0.17) (0.04) (-0.11) (0.01) (-0.27) (-0.54)
Reconsider 0.012 0.012 0.007 -0.003
(0.25) (0.24) (0.13) (-0.07)
Loyal Client 0.03 0.023 0.024 0.011
of Distributor (0.74) (0.59) (0.62) (0.29)
Trust in -0.080** -0.078** -0.084** -0.104***
Distributor (-2.12) (-2.09) (-2.28) (-2.86)
Familiar with -0.074* -0.076* -0.085** -0.080**
Sales (-1.90) (-1.96) (-2.21) (-2.07)
Bank of China -0.044 -0.05 -0.057 -0.056
(-1.22) (-1.40) (-1.62) (-1.57)
Control for
Product Character No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for
Market Condition No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.681*** 0.865*** 1.312*** 0.840*** 0.971*** 1.425*** 1.437*** 1.532***
#Obs. 249 242 234 249 242 234 234 225
Adj.R2 0.06 0.096 0.098 0.099 0.118 0.122 0.144 0.186
48
Table VIII
Definition of IQ Measures
We construct measures for IQ (or intelligence) based on investor’s education level and comprehension (reading ability).
Low IQ is defined as investors who have finished high school education, but cannot read or can only read some. There
are 53 (6.98%) investors in this group. High IQ means investors who have not received education beyond primary
school, but can read or read some. IQ Four Element Measured and IQ Benchmark Measured are defined in Panel B.
The correlation matrix of the four IQ measures is reported in Panel C.
Panel A: Classification of IQ Measures
Primary- High School College
Cannot Read Medium IQ Low IQ Low IQ
(57) (5) (0)
Can Read Some Medium IQ Low IQ Low IQ
(162) (39) (3)
Can Read High IQ Ambiguous Ambiguous
(93) (280) (114)
Panel B: Definition of IQ Measures
Proxy Name Type Description
Above Low IQ Dummy =1 if investor do not belong to the Low IQ category;
High IQ Dummy =1 if investor have primary or below education but can read or read some;
IQ Four Element Measured 1-4 4=High IQ, 3=Ambiguous, 2=Medium IQ, and 1=Low IQ;
IQ Benchmark Measured 1-3 3=High IQ, 2=Ambiguous=Medium, and 1=Low IQ.
Panel C: Correlation of IQ Measures and Education
Education Above High Above Low High IQ Four Element
(years) School Dummy IQ IQ Measured
Above High School Dummy 0.93
Above Low IQ -0.15 -0.23
High IQ -0.79 -0.85 0.18
IQ Four Element Measured 0.15 0.12 0.58 0.02
IQ Benchmark Measured -0.4 -0.47 0.64 0.51 0.82
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Table IX
IQ and Investment Decision
This table reports the effects of investors’ IQ on their investment decision making. In Panel A, in the first column,
“Above Low IQ Dummy” contains 227 of 1 and 20 of 0. In the fifth column, “High IQ Dummy” contains 32 of 1
and 211 of 0. In Panel B, in the first column, “IQ Four Element Measured” contains 16, 72, 123, and 32 of 1 to 4,
respectively. In the fifth column, “IQ Benchmark Measured” contains 16, 195 and 32 of 1 to 3, respectively.
Panel A: Above Low IQ, High IQ and Investment Proportion
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
IQ Measure = Above Low IQ Dummy IQ Measure = High IQ Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IQ Measure -0.160** -0.238*** -0.243*** -0.236*** 0.099*** -0.148** -0.143** -0.135**
(2.51) (3.78) (3.64) (3.58) (2.72) (-2.53) (-2.33) (-2.22)
Above High School -0.170*** -0.140*** -0.131***
(-4.89) (-3.62) (-3.38)
Education(years) -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.032***
(-5.23) (-4.16) (-3.82)
Calculation -0.074* -0.074*
(-1.94) (-1.91)
Financially Literate -0.076* -0.073*
(-1.95) (-1.83)
Buy Lottery 0.013 0.008 -0.012 -0.015
(0.31) (0.19) (-0.28) (-0.36)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.55) (-0.69) (-0.58) (-0.66)
Retired -0.024 -0.013 -0.017 -0.007
(-0.55) (-0.29) (-0.39) (-0.16)
Income -0.019* -0.015 -0.015 -0.012
(-1.86) (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.20)
Own House -0.052 -0.033 -0.044 -0.028
(-1.10) (-0.69) (-0.92) (-0.58)
Male -0.061 -0.048 -0.038 -0.027
(-1.54) (-1.22) (-0.95) (-0.66)
Married -0.035 -0.019 -0.017 -0.005
(-0.57) (-0.31) (-0.27) (-0.09)
Cannot Recall -0.064 -0.108 -0.015 -0.061
(-0.40) (-0.69) (-0.10) (-0.39)
Reconsider -0.002 -0.007 0.02 0.015
(-0.04) (-0.14) (0.41) (0.31)
Loyal Client 0.033 0.018 0.012 -0.002
of Distributor (0.84) (0.47) (0.31) (-0.05)
Trust in Distributor -0.090** -0.101*** -0.089** -0.101***
(-2.46) (-2.80) (-2.42) (-2.78)
Familiar with Sales -0.069* -0.066* -0.078** -0.074*
(-1.81) (-1.73) (-2.03) (-1.92)
Bank of China -0.033 -0.051 -0.057 -0.072**
(-0.93) (-1.44) (-1.60) (-2.03)
Control for
Product Character No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Control for
Market Condition No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.585*** 0.677*** 1.317*** 1.414*** 0.558*** 1.043*** 1.643*** 1.727***
#Obs. 247 247 232 229 243 243 228 225
Adj.R2 0.021 0.105 0.15 0.182 0.026 0.122 0.153 0.183
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Table IX-Continue
Panel B: IQ Measures and Investment Proportion
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
IQ Measure = IQ Four Element Measured IQ Measure = IQ Benchmark Measured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IQ Measure -0.077*** -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.063*** -0.028 -0.135*** -0.140*** -0.125***
(-3.43) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.64) (-0.69) (-3.28) (-3.11) (-2.75)
Education(years) -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.024***
(-5.00) (-3.42) (-3.13) (-6.32) (-4.75) (-4.24)
Calculation -0.058 -0.057
(-1.44) (-1.42)
Financially Literate -0.083** -0.080**
(-2.13) (-2.06)
Buy Lottery -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011
(-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.18) (-0.27)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.49) (-0.63) (-0.49) (-0.62)
Retired -0.025 -0.01 -0.022 -0.008
(-0.57) (-0.24) (-0.50) (-0.18)
Income -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012
(-1.46) (-1.18) (-1.41) (-1.15)
Own House -0.048 -0.033 -0.05 -0.036
(-1.01) (-0.69) (-1.06) (-0.75)
Male -0.043 -0.032 -0.041 -0.03
(-1.09) (-0.80) (-1.04) (-0.76)
Married -0.028 -0.015 -0.028 -0.015
(-0.47) (-0.24) (-0.46) (-0.23)
Cannot Recall -0.047 -0.093 -0.053 -0.096
(-0.30) (-0.59) (-0.34) (-0.61)
Reconsider -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(-0.05) (-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.11)
Loyal Client 0.022 0.009 0.019 0.007
of Distributor (0.56) (0.24) (0.49) (0.18)
Trust in -0.094** -0.104*** -0.095** -0.105***
Distributor (-2.57) (-2.89) (-2.60) (-2.90)
Familiar with -0.083** -0.080** -0.082** -0.079**
Sales (-2.17) (-2.08) (-2.15) (-2.06)
Bank of China -0.041 -0.057 -0.044 -0.059*
(-1.17) (-1.61) (-1.25) (-1.67)
Control for
Product Character No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Control for
Market Condition No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.801*** 0.989*** 1.623*** 1.689*** 0.651*** 1.180*** 1.806*** 1.846***
#Obs. 243 243 228 225 243 243 228 225
Adj.R2 0.043 0.13 0.166 0.191 -0.002 0.137 0.17 0.193
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Table X
Investment Decision by Product Type
This table reports the effects of all the variables we have previously tested on credit-linked note investors’ and equity-
linked note investors’ investment decision making. “Financially Literate” equals to 1 if investor’s expectation to Hong
Kong stock annual return lies between 5.1% and 50%. All the missing variables are filled with zero and controlled by
dummy variables. The dummy variables are not reported here.
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Credit-linked Note Investors Equity-linked Note Investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Financially Literate -0.049 -0.05 -0.237* -0.215*
(-1.23) (-1.34) (-1.86) (-1.83)
Calculation -0.041 -0.02
(-1.03) (-0.10)
Comprehension -0.123*** -0.249***
(-4.69) (-4.27)
Education(years) -0.026*** -0.025***
(-7.36) (-3.69)
IQ 4 Element -0.034** -0.080**
Measured (-2.33) (-2.24)
Premium -0.034* -0.033* -0.032* -0.030*
(-1.75) (-1.71) (-1.67) (-1.66)
Max Rating 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.015
(0.37) (0.42) (0.38) (0.79)
Max-Min Rating 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.011
(0.64) (0.61) (0.69) (0.77)
Maturity(years) -0.022 -0.021 -0.02 0.000
(-1.26) (-1.20) (-1.15) (-0.02)
#Reference Entity -0.032* -0.032* -0.03 -0.038**
(-1.73) (-1.69) (-1.63) (-2.17)
Coupon Freq. 0.244 0.244 0.213 0.053
(1.11) (1.11) (0.99) (0.26)
Currency 0.047* 0.047* 0.054** 0.061**
(1.83) (1.85) (2.16) (2.51)
Buy Lottery 0.000 -0.002 -0.014 -0.009 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.025
(0.01) (-0.06) (-0.49) (-0.34) (0.12) (0.22) (0.27) (0.49)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005* -0.004*
(0.24) (0.22) (0.00) (-0.66) (-0.55) (-0.68) (-1.72) (-1.69)
Retired 0.017 0.021 -0.005 -0.012 0.005 0.021 -0.012 -0.013
(0.48) (0.60) (-0.15) (-0.37) (0.08) (0.35) (-0.21) (-0.23)
Income -0.023** -0.024** -0.011 -0.008 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.013
(-1.98) (-2.06) (-0.95) (-0.71) (-0.00) (0.35) (0.15) (0.66)
Own House -0.082 -0.077 -0.057 -0.032 -0.08 -0.021 -0.125 -0.028
(-1.64) (-1.54) (-1.15) (-0.67) (-0.36) (-0.09) (-0.46) (-0.14)
Male -0.046 -0.043 -0.033 -0.026 -0.121* -0.112* -0.142** -0.099*
(-1.59) (-1.49) (-1.17) (-0.96) (-1.94) (-1.82) (-2.35) (-1.75)
Married 0.006 0.007 0.000 -0.003 -0.014 -0.012 -0.043 -0.037
(0.17) (0.19) (-0.01) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.63) (-0.60)
Reconsider 0.066* 0.064* 0.067* 0.065* -0.146* -0.129* -0.095 -0.102
(1.76) (1.68) (1.81) (1.85) (-1.87) (-1.67) (-1.27) (-1.42)
Loyal Client 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.006
of Distributor (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (-0.17) (0.08) (0.03) (-0.08) (-0.14)
Trust in Distributor -0.036 -0.04 -0.046 -0.025 -0.231 -0.114 -0.212 -0.096
(-1.02) (-1.11) (-1.33) (-0.75) (-1.13) (-0.54) (-0.98) (-0.50)
Familiar with Sales -0.057 -0.06 -0.069* -0.074** 0.059 0.023 0.082 0.064
(-1.42) (-1.49) (-1.77) (-1.97) (0.46) (0.18) (0.54) (0.56)
Bank of China -0.015 -0.017 -0.009 -0.019 -0.037 -0.038 -0.062 -0.053
(-0.56) (-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.76) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.68) (-0.62)
Constant 1.151*** 1.165*** 1.242*** 1.430*** 2.018* 1.467 2.450** 2.082**
#Obs. 493 493 493 493 126 126 126 126
Adj.R2 0.032 0.033 0.085 0.151 -0.047 -0.022 0.084 0.174
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Table XI
Investment Decision in Subgroups by Age and Affluence
This table reports the effects of all the variables we have tested on the investment decision making of investors in
subgroups specified by age and affluence. All investors with age below 50 or have income less than HK$20,000 can
report the name of product they purchased or/and the month they purchased the product, so we do not keep the
“Cannot Recall” variable in the right regression since it is constant. All regressions control for product characteristics
and market condition.
Panel A. Investment Decision in Subgroups by Age
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Age equal to 50 or above Age below 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Literate -0.112** -0.106** -0.123*** -0.003 -0.037 -0.051
(-2.39) (-2.28) (-2.71) (-0.04) (-0.49) (-0.71)
Education(years) -0.017*** -0.015** -0.022** -0.017
(-2.68) (-2.45) (-2.10) (-1.61)
IQ 4 Element -0.086*** -0.092*
Measured (-3.14) (-1.73)
Buy Lottery 0.003 -0.005 -0.022 -0.031 0.082 0.082 0.078 0.046
(0.06) (-0.10) (-0.41) (-0.59) (1.07) (1.06) (1.04) (0.62)
Income -0.018 -0.017 -0.012 -0.007 -0.067** -0.067** -0.049* -0.038
(-1.58) (-1.55) (-1.04) (-0.67) (-2.52) (-2.49) (-1.80) (-1.44)
Own House -0.061 -0.051 0.02 0.017 -0.037 -0.037 -0.056 -0.094
(-0.98) (-0.83) (0.31) (0.27) (-0.46) (-0.45) (-0.70) (-1.20)
Male -0.06 -0.043 -0.036 -0.007 -0.078 -0.078 -0.04 -0.059
(-1.24) (-0.89) (-0.73) (-0.15) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-0.49) (-0.73)
Married -0.021 -0.014 0.021 -0.008 -0.122 -0.122 -0.106 -0.047
(-0.27) (-0.17) (0.26) (-0.10) (-1.07) (-1.06) (-0.95) (-0.43)
Cannot Recall -0.065 -0.103 -0.077 -0.147
(-0.37) (-0.59) (-0.45) (-0.89)
Reconsider -0.011 -0.031 -0.043 -0.083 0.049 0.049 0.078 0.054
(-0.17) (-0.47) (-0.63) (-1.24) (0.64) (0.63) (1.02) (0.73)
Loyal Client -0.01 0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.148** 0.147* 0.112 0.089
of Distributor (-0.18) (0.13) (-0.10) (-0.11) (2.06) (1.94) (1.51) (1.24)
Trust in Distributor -0.090* -0.094** -0.082* -0.098** -0.099 -0.099 -0.072 -0.11
(-1.96) (-2.06) (-1.81) (-2.25) (-1.33) (-1.31) (-0.98) (-1.54)
Familiar with Sales -0.076 -0.087* -0.091* -0.109** -0.108 -0.108 -0.147** -0.143**
(-1.53) (-1.77) (-1.86) (-2.29) (-1.56) (-1.53) (-2.09) (-2.04)
Bank of China -0.048 -0.055 -0.067 -0.064 -0.087 -0.087 -0.095 -0.063
(-1.08) (-1.24) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-1.27) (-0.87)
Control for
Product Character Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for
Market Condition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.515*** 1.517*** 1.528*** 1.860*** 1.01 1.01 0.997 1.496*
#Obs. 176 176 172 168 63 63 63 61
Adj.R2 0.02 0.049 0.091 0.159 0.178 0.158 0.223 0.294
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Table XI–Continue
Panel B. Investment Decision in Subgroups by Financial Affluence
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Top Wealth Quartile Wealth Above Median Income below 20,000 Income 20,000-99,999 Everyone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Literate -0.175** -0.165** -0.119* -0.135** -0.103** -0.108** -0.096 -0.082 -0.103***
(-2.34) (-2.22) (-1.89) (-2.25) (-2.24) (-2.44) (-1.22) (-0.99) (-2.82)
Education -0.018 -0.016** -0.018*** -0.01 -0.017***
(years) (-1.59) (-2.10) (-3.09) (-0.72) (-3.33)
IQ 4 Element -0.017 -0.070** -0.086*** -0.077 -0.071***
Measured (-0.27) (-2.00) (-3.25) (-0.89) (-3.07)
Buy Lottery 0.111 0.134 0.019 0.021 -0.047 -0.068 0.197** 0.187* -0.009
(1.16) (1.38) (0.29) (0.34) (-0.90) (-1.32) (2.16) (1.93) (-0.21)
Age 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.001
(0.07) (-0.39) (0.52) (-0.03) (-0.70) (-0.89) (1.48) (0.88) (-0.68)
Retired 0.026 0.051 0.034 0.042 0.04 -0.001 -0.126 -0.074 -0.007
(0.27) (0.48) (0.47) (0.61) (0.72) (-0.01) (-1.31) (-0.67) (-0.16)
Income -0.026* -0.022 -0.021* -0.013 0.127* 0.175*** -0.048* -0.037 -0.013
(-1.75) (-1.46) (-1.67) (-1.09) (1.95) (2.81) (-1.80) (-1.22) (-1.34)
Own House -0.135 -0.099 -0.106 -0.103 -0.073 -0.028 -0.053 -0.067 -0.038
(-1.08) (-0.80) (-1.11) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-0.55) (-0.34) (-0.38) (-0.81)
Male -0.231** -0.219** -0.069 -0.047 -0.042 -0.007 -0.022 -0.026 -0.033
(-2.67) (-2.53) (-1.15) (-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.84)
Married 0.123 0.153 0.006 -0.007 0.003 -0.015 -0.038 0.058 -0.024
(0.78) (0.94) (0.06) (-0.06) (0.04) (-0.24) (-0.15) (0.20) (-0.41)
Cannot Recall -0.315 -0.28 -0.296 -0.361* - - 0.115 0.102 -0.1
(-1.50) (-1.32) (-1.40) (-1.82) - - (0.68) (0.58) (-0.64)
Reconsider 0.193* 0.199* 0.027 0.033 0.014 0.003 0.099 0.117 -0.01
(1.97) (1.96) (0.37) (0.47) (0.25) (0.05) (0.72) (0.80) (-0.20)
Loyal Client -0.134 -0.149 -0.002 -0.044 0.02 0.021 0.093 0.069 0.022
of Distributor (-1.42) (-1.60) (-0.03) (-0.71) (0.41) (0.46) (1.23) (0.87) (0.57)
Trust in -0.087 -0.1 -0.121** -0.124** -0.067 -0.059 -0.069 -0.075 -0.101***
Distributor (-1.04) (-1.17) (-2.10) (-2.28) (-1.36) (-1.24) (-0.97) (-1.00) (-2.81)
Familiar with 0.01 0.019 -0.02 -0.029 -0.071 -0.107** -0.084 -0.047 -0.092**
Sales (0.09) (0.19) (-0.30) (-0.46) (-1.57) (-2.47) (-0.96) (-0.49) (-2.45)
Bank of China -0.217*** -0.212*** -0.139** -0.140*** -0.032 -0.023 -0.099 -0.072 -0.05
(-2.94) (-2.86) (-2.46) (-2.65) (-0.74) (-0.56) (-1.29) (-0.85) (-1.43)
Control for
Product Character Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for
Market Condition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.65 1.294 1.260** 1.719*** 1.208*** 1.553*** 0.465 0.294 1.657***
#Obs. 61 60 113 108 183 175 50 49 228
Adj.R2 0.369 0.394 0.111 0.24 0.019 0.161 0.333 0.276 0.193
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Table XII
Determinants of Financial Literacy
This table shows the possible determinants of investors to be financially literate. We run probit regression on the
proxy for financial literacy. The dependent variable “Financially Literate Dummy” equals to 1 if investor’s expectation
to Hong Kong stock market annual return lies between 5.1% and 50%. Z statistics are in parentheses, *, ** and ***
represent that p<0.1, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively.
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable = Financially Literate Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education 0.048** 0.051*
(2.05) (1.66)
IQ 4 Element 0.005
Measured (0.05)
Calculation 0.867*** 0.822***
(4.84) (4.53)
Comprehension -0.124 -0.350
(-0.67) (-1.50)
Buy Lottery -0.077 -0.012 -0.041 -0.049 0.013
(-0.41) (-0.06) (-0.21) (-0.25) (0.06)
Age -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009
(-0.66) (-0.55) (-0.87) (-1.03) (-0.88)
Retired 0.392* 0.424** 0.428** 0.484** 0.476**
(1.84) (1.98) (1.97) (2.11) (2.07)
Income 0.028 0.007 0.032 0.004 -0.010
(0.69) (0.16) (0.78) (0.09) (-0.23)
Own House 0.218 0.184 0.261 0.127 0.107
(0.99) (0.80) (1.15) (0.54) (0.45)
Male 0.274 0.193 0.281 0.326* 0.273
(1.55) (1.07) (1.56) (1.74) (1.44)
Married 0.287 0.362 0.371 0.193 0.232
(1.06) (1.30) (1.32) (0.69) (0.81)
Constant -0.951* -1.503** -1.013* -0.906 -1.318**
(-1.77) (-2.55) (-1.65) (-1.59) (-2.15)
#Obs. 269 265 259 259 256
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.043 0.035 0.105 0.110
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Table XIII
Heckman Selection Model with Comparative Sample
This table reports the results of Heckman Selection Model test. We randomly asked 75 Hong Kong citizens and
obtained their information of all the demographic characteristics we asked before, as well as their relationship with
the bank where they save money, their self-reported trust towards the banks, and their familiarity with their client
managers. None of these investors purchased credit-linked notes or equity-linked notes. We took this sample as
comparative sample and ran Heckman two step regressions. Z statistics is in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent
that p<0.1, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table XIII-Continue
Independent Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion
Variables Selection Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financially Literate -0.091* -0.094*** -0.097***
(-1.717) (-2.596) (-2.806)
Comprehension -0.139 -0.122*** -0.133***
(-0.394) (-2.944) (-3.272)
Calculation -0.426* -0.054 -0.025
(-1.761) (-1.324) (-0.603)
Education(years) -0.078** -0.014** -0.015*** -0.015***
(-1.991) (-2.103) (-2.577) (-2.690)
IQ 4 Element -0.058** -0.061***
Measured (-2.462) (-2.724)
Buy Lottery -0.949*** 0.105 0.07 0.062 0.076 0.062 0.046
(-4.043) (1.386) (1.341) (1.21) (1.209) (1.183) (0.891)
Age 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.333) (-0.464) (-0.569) (-0.746) (-0.715) (-0.756) (-0.900)
Retired 0.542** -0.051 -0.066 -0.046 -0.059 -0.059 -0.036
(-2.141) (-0.724) (-1.434) (-1.009) (-1.056) (-1.283) (-0.798)
Income -0.074 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(-1.642) (-0.283) (-0.558) (-0.525) (-0.273) (-0.426) (-0.453)
Own House 0.564** -0.130* -0.087* -0.077 -0.105* -0.089* -0.07
(1.988) (-1.782) (-1.692) (-1.539) (-1.736) (-1.749) (-1.432)
Male -0.457** -0.007 -0.023 -0.016 -0.015 -0.02 -0.015
(-1.974) (-0.109) (-0.537) (-0.390) (-0.303) (-0.468) (-0.371)
Married 0.703* -0.068 -0.053 -0.046 -0.058 -0.05 -0.038
(-1.942) (-0.685) (-0.804) (-0.706) (-0.741) (-0.757) (-0.595)
Cannot Recall -0.103 -0.076 -0.124 -0.047 -0.076 -0.122
(-0.487) (-0.537) (-0.877) (-0.280) (-0.534) (-0.859)
Reconsider 0.004 -0.01 -0.014 0.008 -0.006 -0.011
(0.062) (-0.225) (-0.304) (0.147) (-0.139) (-0.240)
Loyal Client -0.745*** 0.094 0.066 0.067 0.084 0.071 0.063
of Distributor (-2.871) (1.408) (1.432) (1.472) (1.568) (1.598) (1.447)
Trust in 0.776*** -0.208*** -0.170*** -0.168*** -0.174*** -0.161*** -0.154***
Distributor (4.802) (-3.155) (-3.743) (-3.760) (-3.158) (-3.483) (-3.401)
Familiar with 0.486** -0.132** -0.109** -0.120*** -0.115** -0.113*** -0.118***
Sales (2.089) (-2.084) (-2.523) (-2.817) (-2.298) (-2.703) (-2.897)
Bank of China -0.014 -0.027 -0.028 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035
(-0.262) (-0.742) (-0.789) (-0.795) (-0.984) (-0.977)
HIBOR -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018
(-0.704) (-1.098) (-1.189) (-0.820) (-1.143) (-1.144)
HSI Quarterly Return 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(-0.161) (-0.598) (-0.239) (-0.399) (-0.517) (-0.169)
Premium -0.006 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.001
(-0.239) (-0.150) (-0.027) (-0.255) (0.01) (0.072)
Max Rating 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.008
(0.013) (-0.145) (0.110) (0.058) (0.188) (0.281)
Max-Min Rating 0.017 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013
(0.501) (0.967) (0.762) (0.590) (0.658) (0.608)
Maturity(years) -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.01
(-0.062) (-0.041) (0.135) (0.165) (0.297) (0.403)
#Reference Entity 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.013) (-0.102) (-0.030) (-0.175) (-0.116) (-0.066)
Coupon Freq. 0.245 0.153 0.127 0.15 0.088 0.077
(0.621) (0.576) (0.485) (0.474) (0.33) (0.298)
Currency 0.067 0.054* 0.054* 0.061* 0.054* 0.053*
(1.465) (1.767) (1.817) (1.689) (1.760) (1.814)
ELN Dummy 0.044 0.038 0.057 0.074 0.081 0.081
(0.218) (0.282) (0.426) (0.465) (0.607) (0.624)
Constant -2.072* 1.955*** 1.825*** 1.783*** 1.910*** 1.945*** 1.897***
Mills λ -0.402** -0.261** -0.242** -0.319** -0.256** -0.207*
(-2.526) (-2.228) (-2.089) (-2.348) (-2.200) (-1.778)
#Obs 301 301 301 301 301 301 301
Pseudo R2 0.469
χ2 30.379 72.697 81.9 47.355 73.497 85.979
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Appendix I
Definition of Main Variables
This table reports the definition the key variables we used in the analysis. The data comes directly from the survey
we conducted from January 15 to June 18, 2009. The questions addressing monthly income, monthly expense, owning
house, familiar with sales, calculation are added after March 14, 2009. The setting of “Financially Literate” is inspired
by the fact that the average annual return of Hang Seng Index is around 12% in the past three years (2006, 2007,
and 2008); the setting of “Financially Literate (Proxy 2)” is inspired by the fact that the average risk premium of
structured products in our sample is 5%. The products can be purchased in either Hong Kong dollar (HKD) or U.S.
dollar (USD). We convert USD to HKD at the exchange rate of 8.0, and measure all capital in HKD.
Variable Name Unit Definition
Investment Characteristics
InvestProportion 0-1 Proportion of the investor’s asset invested in the structured product.
Investment HK$mn Amount of investment in millions of Hong Kong dollars.
Financially Literate Dummy =1 if the investor’s expectation to stock market return lies between 5.1% and 50%.
Financially Literate (Proxy 2) Dummy =1 if the investor’s expectation to stock market annual return lies between 7%
and 17%.
Buy Lottery Dummy =1 if investor claims buying lottery more often than once half a year.
Reconsider Dummy =1 if the investor consider did not buy the product the day he was approached
by the salesman.
Loyal Client of Distributor Dummy =1 if the investor’s relationship with distributing bank is longer than 10
years.
Trust in Distributor 1-5 Measure of the investor’s trust in the distributing bank. 1 means completely doubt,
and 5 means completely trust.
Familiar with Sales Dummy =1 if the investor is familiar the salesman of the structured product.
Bank of China Dummy =1 if the investor buys structured products from Bank of China.
Product Characteristics
Premium Number The difference between the product’s coupon rate and fixed deposit rate at the
product’s issuing date; premium for ELN is given as 10.
Max Rating Number The maximal rating of the reference obligations of each structured product.
Max-Min Rating Number The difference of the maximum and minimum of the reference obligation.
Maturity Year The maturity of the structured product that the investor purchased.
#Ref Entity Number The amount of reference entity or amount of linked companies.
Coupon Freq. Number The frequency of coupon payment. 1/2=semi-annually, 1/4=quarterly,
1/12=monthly.
Currency Dummy =1 if the product is U.S. dollar type.
#Ref Entity Number The amount of reference entity or amount of linked companies.
ELN Dummy Dummy =1 if the investor buy ELN.
Financial Characteristics
Wealth HK$mn The investor’s total financial assets.
Income HK$10,000 The investor family’s current monthly income.
Own House Dummy =1 if the investor owns house.
SavingProportion 0-1 Proportion of the investor’s asset allocated in saving.
StockProportion 0-2 Proportion of the investor’s allocated in buying stock.
BuyStock Dummy =1 if the investor buys stock.
BuyRisky Dummy =1 if the investor buys risky assets.
HIBOR Number Hong Kong Inter-Bank Offer Rate at the issue date of the product.
HSI Quarterly Return Number Hang Seng Index quarterly return at the issue date of the product.
Demographic Characteristics
Education Years =6, 12, or 16 if the investor has finished all or some primary school education, all
or some high school education, or all or some college education.
Age Years Age of the investor.
Male Dummy =1 if the investor is male.
Retired Dummy =1 if the investor is retired or unemployed.
Married Dummy =1 if the investor is married.
HighSchool Dummy =1 if the investor finished or finished some high school education.
College Dummy =1 if the investor finished or finished some college education or more
advanced education.
Comprehension Dummy =1 if the investor can read traditional or simplified Chinese characters well.
Calculation Dummy =1 if the investor can do simple or compound interest rate calculation.
Cannot Recall Dummy =1 if the investor cannot recall the name of security and the month when he/she
purchased the security.
Bank Sales Characteristics
Bank Initiate Transaction Dummy =1 if the distributing banks initiated the transaction of structured products instead
of the investors.
No Risk Profile Evaluation Dummy =1 if distributing banks did not evaluate investors’ profile or did not notice
investors their risk profile.
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Appendix II
Sample Comparison
The table reports the summary statistics of our survey sample compared with two major survey samples in Hong
Kong. The data for our sample were collected by questionnaire survey on Hong Kong investors who had purchased
credit-linked note or/and equity-linked note from February 2003 to May 2008. We conducted the survey from January
15 to June 18, 2009, and obtained 783 responses. Panel A shows the characteristics of structured product investors
compared with “2006 Population By-census” report conducted by Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department from
July to August 2006, and “Retail Investor Survey 2009” conducted by Hong Kong Exchange and Cleaning Limited
from November to December 2009. The data for “Monthly Income”, “Own House”, were obtained only after March
14, 2009.
Panel A. Sample Characteristics
Variables Sample HK By-census 2006 HKEx 2009
Demographics
Age (median) 58 45 45
Male 0.37 0.47 0.46
Retired/Unemployed 0.76 0.38 0.22
Married 0.83 0.62 -
Financial Occupation 0.04 0.04 0.09
Years of Education 10.14 10.06 -
Some/Finished High School 0.59 0.30 0.66
Some/Finished College 0.15 0.24 0.36
Comprehension 0.65 - -
Calculation 0.34 - -
Financial Related
Monthly Income(median, HK$10,000) 1.77 1.73 1.63
Own House 0.82 0.53 -
Buy Stock 0.40 - 0.36
Number of Observations 783 5,102,513 2,303
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Appendix III
Detailed Information of Credit-Linked Notes
This table shows the detailed information of two main credit-linked notes in our sample: Minibond and Constellation.
“Hang Seng Index” is reported as of the issue date. “Fixed Deposit Rate” and “Current Deposit Rate” are reported
as of the month before the issue date. In panel A, The second period interest rate for Minibond Series 11A is 8%
minus six month LIBOR (LB), and 7.6% minus six month HIBOR (HB) for Minibond Series 11B. During the time
we conduct the survey from January 2009 to June 2009, there are 28 series of Minibond and 40 series of Constellation
outstanding in the market. In our sample, there are 464 Minibond investors and 80 Constellation investors.
Panel A: Minibond
Series
No.
Issue
Date
#Investor
(sample)
Interest
Rate
Period1
Interest
Rate
Period2
Currency
Maturity
Date
#Ref.
Entity
Max
Rating
Min
Rating
Coupon
Freq.
5 2003/7/2 3 3.8 - USD 2005/07/02 1 A- A- Semi-Ann
6 2003/9/24 2 5 8 USD 2005/09/25 150 AA- A- Annually
7A 2003/12/3 3 4.2 - USD 2008/12/03 6 AA- BBB Semi-Ann
7B 2003/12/3 10 4.2 - HKD 2008/12/03 6 AA- BBB Semi-Ann
8 2004/3/3 0 7 - HKD 2009/03/03 5 A- BBB Semi-Ann
9A 2004/3/25 2 3.7 4.3 USD 2009/09/25 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
9B 2004/3/25 20 3.5 4.1 HKD 2009/09/25 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
10A 2004/5/28 4 4.25 4.75 USD 2009/11/28 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
10B 2004/5/28 17 4 4.5 HKD 2009/11/28 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
11A 2004/7/6 5 8 8 - LB USD 2010/01/06 1 A- A- Semi-Ann
11B 2004/7/6 15 7.6 7.6 -HB HKD 2010/01/06 1 A- A- Semi-Ann
12A 2004/9/8 6 4.65 5.4 USD 2010/03/08 6 A+ BBB Semi-Ann
12B 2004/9/8 23 4.1 5.1 HKD 2010/03/08 6 A+ BBB Semi-Ann
15A 2004/12/28 7 4.3 5 USD 2010/06/28 6 A+ BBB+ Semi-Ann
15B 2004/12/28 8 3.3 4 HKD 2010/06/28 6 A+ BBB+ Semi-Ann
16A 2005/2/7 10 4.2 4.75 USD 2010/08/07 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
16B 2005/2/7 10 3.2 3.75 HKD 2010/08/07 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
17A 2005/3/9 9 4.35 5 USD 2010/09/09 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
17B 2005/3/9 10 3.6 4.2 HKD 2010/09/09 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
18A 2005/4/6 6 4.5 5.5 USD 2010/10/06 7 AAA A- Semi-Ann
18B 2005/4/6 9 3.7 4.7 HKD 2010/10/06 7 AAA A- Semi-Ann
19A 2005/5/26 18 4.75 4.15 USD 2010/11/26 7 AA- A- Semi-Ann
19B 2005/5/26 0 5.75 5.15 HKD 2010/11/26 7 AA- A- Semi-Ann
20A 2005/7/20 3 4.8 6 USD 2011/01/20 7 A+ A- Quarterly
20B 2005/7/20 3 4.2 5.4 HKD 2011/01/20 7 A+ A- Quarterly
21A 2005/9/15 3 5.2 6.1 USD 2011/03/15 7 A+ A- Quarterly
21B 2005/9/15 15 4.8 5.6 HKD 2011/03/15 7 A+ A- Quarterly
22A 2005/11/25 1 4.65 5.65 USD 2011/05/25 7 AA- A- Quarterly
22B 2005/11/25 2 4.4 5.4 HKD 2011/05/25 7 AA- A- Quarterly
23A 2006/2/3 2 5.35 6 USD 2011/08/03 7 A+ A- Quarterly
23B 2006/2/3 18 5.1 5.75 HKD 2011/08/03 7 A+ A- Quarterly
25A 2006/4/26 1 5.5 6.5 USD 2011/10/26 7 AA- A- Quarterly
25B 2006/4/26 11 5.3 6 HKD 2011/10/26 7 AA- A- Quarterly
26A 2006/6/30 0 5.5 6.5 USD 2011/12/30 8 AA- A- Quarterly
26B 2006/6/30 2 5.3 6 HKD 2011/12/30 8 AA- A- Quarterly
27A 2006/9/15 10 7 8.3 USD 2009/09/15 7 A+ A+ Quarterly
27B 2006/9/15 30 6.3 7.5 HKD 2009/09/15 7 A+ A+ Quarterly
(To be continued)
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Appendix III-Continue
Panel A: Minibond
Series
No.
Issue
Date
#Investor
(sample)
Interest
Rate
Period1
Interest
Rate
Period2
Currency
Maturity
Date
#Ref.
Entity
Max
Rating
Min
Rating
Coupon
Freq.
28A 2006/10/27 9 6.5 8 USD 2009/10/27 7 A+ A Quarterly
28B 2006/10/27 11 5.5 7 HKD 2009/10/27 7 A+ A Quarterly
29A 2006/12/21 9 6 7.5 USD 2009/12/21 7 A+ A Quarterly
29B 2006/12/21 10 5 6.5 HKD 2009/12/21 7 A+ A Quarterly
30A 2007/01/31 2 6 7.5 USD 2010/02/01 7 AA- A Quarterly
30B 2007/01/31 7 5 6.5 HKD 2010/02/01 7 AA- A Quarterly
31A 2007/04/19 3 6 7.6 USD 2010/04/19 8 AA- A Quarterly
31B 2007/04/19 8 5.5 7.1 HKD 2010/04/19 8 AA- A Quarterly
32A 2007/07/16 1 6.1 7.8 USD 2010/07/16 8 AA- A Quarterly
32B 2007/07/16 1 5.5 7.1 HKD 2010/07/16 8 AA- A Quarterly
33A 2007/08/31 2 7 9.1 USD 2010/08/31 8 AA- A Quarterly
33B 2007/08/31 12 6.3 8.1 HKD 2010/08/31 8 AA- A Quarterly
34A 2008/01/07 16 6 - USD 2011/01/07 7 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
34B 2008/01/07 50 5.6 - HKD 2011/01/07 7 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
35A 2008/02/22 19 6 - USD 2011/02/22 7 AA A- Quarterly
35B 2008/02/22 116 5.6 - HKD 2011/02/22 7 AA A- Quarterly
36A 2008/05/15 14 5.5 - USD 2011/05/15 7 AA A- Quarterly
36B 2008/05/15 49 5 - HKD 2011/05/15 7 AA A- Quarterly
(To be continued)
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Panel B: Constellation
Series
No.
Issue
Date
#Investor
(sample)
Interest
Rate
Period1
Interest
Rate
Period2
Currency
Maturity
Date
#Ref.
Entity
Max
Rating
Min
Rating
Coupon
Freq.
34 2006/03/28 2 6 6.2 USD 2009/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
35 2006/03/28 5 5.5 6 HKD 2009/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
36 2006/03/28 0 5 5.2 USD 2008/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
37 2006/03/28 9 4.5 5 HKD 2008/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
39 2006/05/26 3 5.75 7 USD 2010/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
40 2006/05/26 2 5.35 6.5 HKD 2010/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
41 2006/05/26 0 4.5 5.5 USD 2008/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
42 2006/05/26 1 4.1 5.1 HKD 2008/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
43 2006/07/28 9 6.8 8 USD 2010/07/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
44 2006/07/28 13 6.3 7.6 HKD 2010/07/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
45 2006/07/28 3 5.5 6 USD 2009/10/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
46 2006/07/28 2 5 5.5 HKD 2009/10/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
47 2006/09/28 0 6.3 8 USD 2010/09/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
48 2006/09/28 0 6 7 HKD 2010/09/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
49 2006/09/28 0 5 6 USD 2009/03/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
50 2006/09/28 1 4.75 5 HKD 2009/03/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
55 2006/11/22 7 6.6 8 USD 2011/11/22 8 A A- Quarterly
56 2006/11/22 6 6 6.3 HKD 2011/11/22 8 A A- Quarterly
57 2006/11/22 13 6 7 USD 2010/05/22 8 A A- Quarterly
58 2006/11/22 12 5.2 6 HKD 2010/05/22 8 A A- Quarterly
59 2007/01/10 4 5.75 6.75 USD 2012/01/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
60 2007/01/10 5 5 6 HKD 2012/01/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
61 2007/01/10 1 5.1 6.1 USD 2010/07/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
62 2007/01/10 0 4.5 5.25 HKD 2010/07/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
63 2007/02/08 5 6.2 8 USD 2013/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly
64 2007/02/08 2 5.2 6.8 HKD 2013/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly
65 2007/02/08 2 5 5.5 USD 2010/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly
66 2007/02/08 3 4 5 HKD 2010/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly
67 2007/03/22 1 6.3 8.3 USD 2013/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
68 2007/03/22 0 5.6 7 HKD 2013/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
69 2007/03/22 0 5.6 6.6 USD 2011/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
70 2007/03/22 2 5 5.6 HKD 2011/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
71 2007/05/23 1 6.6 8.8 USD 2013/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
72 2007/05/23 2 6 8 HKD 2013/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
73 2007/05/23 0 5.6 6.8 USD 2011/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
74 2007/05/23 0 5.2 6 HKD 2011/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
78 2007/07/23 2 7 9 USD 2013/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
79 2007/07/23 0 6.5 8.5 HKD 2013/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
80 2007/07/23 0 6.2 7.3 USD 2011/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
81 2007/07/23 4 5.7 7.2 HKD 2011/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
62
